## CHAPTER

## DIALECTICAL EDUCATION AND UNWRITTEN TEACHINGS IN PLATO'S STATESMAN<sup>1</sup>

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In these reflections, we will be at work on two projects, letting each provide the occasion for the other. One of these projects is relatively narrow in focus; the other is wide ranging.

The narrow project is to interpret the strange passages near the end of the *Statesman* (287b–291a, 303d–305e) in which the Eleatic Stranger completes the work of distinguishing the statesman by enumerating fifteen kinds of art necessary to the polis:

the "contributive arts":

(1) arts which produce raw materials,

(2) arts which produce tools,

(3) arts which produce containers,

(4) arts which produce vehicles,

(5) arts which produce defences,

(6) arts which produce amusements,

(7) arts which produce nourishments;

the "directly responsible arts":

the arts of service, ordinary. . . :

(8) the art proper to slavery,

(9) the arts of merchants and traders,

(10) the arts of heralds and clerks,

(11) the arts of priests and diviners,

... and precious:

(12) rhetoric,

(13) generalship,

(14) the art of justice;

the art directing all these:

(15) statesmanship.

Why, in offering this enumeration, does the Eleatic Stranger suddenly abandon bifurcatory division, the mode of diairesis he has practiced in *all* of the definitional attempts of the *Sophist* and, up until now, the *Statesman*?<sup>2</sup> He does not explain, but says only that "it is difficult to cut [the arts] into two" and that "the reason, I think, will become clear as we proceed" (287b10–c1). Thus, Plato leaves it up to his readers to ponder the nonbifurcatory distinctions the Stranger presents. What, we must ask, is the new mode of diairesis he is practicing? What, if any, is the ontological structure the new mode reveals in its object field? And what is the point of presenting such structure only in the closing phase of the dialogue, and with such reticence about its significance?

The wide-ranging project is to examine the much larger web of texts and teachings to which the *Statesman* passages belong. Once we have seen how they are spun together, we can discover compelling answers to the questions the passages raise. I shall argue that the Stranger's list of fifteen exhibits the ontological structure envisioned by the "unwritten teachings" Aristotle ascribes to Plato in *Metaphysics* A6. To bring this out, however, I must first interpret Aristotle's compressed and schematic report in A6, and, to do this, I must identify and interpret the several partial displays of the "unwritten teachings" that may be found in the *Parmenides* and the *Philebus*. The path of the essay therefore leads from the *Statesman*, to Aristotle's reports, to passages in the *Parmenides* and the *Philebus*, then back to the *Statesman* in light of the Parmenides and *Philebus* passages, then back to the *Statesman* in light of Aristotle's reports. The result will be a comprehensive reading of the whole web. In the course of this reading, the "unwritten teachings" will emerge with fresh content and by way of, rather than in place of, Plato's indirect communication in the dialogues.

## I. An orienting interpretive thesis: The *Statesman* as a microcosmic exhibition of the long-term process of philosophical education

In the *Statesman*, Plato puts the Academicians on stage before themselves in the *dramatis persona* of "Young Socrates," and he shows them the limitations they must overcome in their future education. Thus, he provides them an occasion for self-knowledge and self-transcendence. Young Socrates, all too ready to defer to the Eleatic Stranger's authority (see 258c together with 267a–c, 276e–277a, 283a–b), shows himself unwittingly under the sway of uncritical opinion (262b–e). Chief among the resources the Stranger offers him in order to free himself are the technique of bifurcatory diairesis, the use of paradigms, and the notion of due measure. Beyond these, he offers the course of inquiry in the *Statesman* itself as an exemplary exhibition of the stages through which the educational process should lead.<sup>3</sup> We might distill the force of this exhibition into the following set of

recommendations: to put a check on the power of uncritical opinion, we should subject ourselves to the discipline of the procedure of bifurcatory diairesis; but to learn the use of this method, we should begin with easy, directly perceptible subjects like the weaver, checking the results of our diairesis against our direct observation of the subject; only when we have achieved competence in the easy cases, should we turn to the hard ones where no perceptual check is possible; but with mastery of bifurcation comes freedom from uncritical opinion and, with this, the capacity to let the subject matter present itself in its own terms; when it does, we will want to set bifurcation aside and let the structure of the subject matter itself be the guide of the distinctions we make.

My interpretive thesis is that when, at 287bff., the Stranger turns from the case of weaving to that of statesmanship and suddenly abandons bifurcation, Plato is projecting for his reader such a future moment, a time when, having achieved mastery of bifurcation, he must be ready to set it aside in order to let the subject itself, in its own proper being, determine the form of analysis. If this is right, then the Stranger's reticence is both prudential and pedagogical. Plato has the Stranger speak on the basis of an insight for which Young Socrates has shown himself not yet ready. For readers who have recognized in themselves Young Socrates' limitations, the task at hand is to practice bifurcatory diairesis; by his reticence, the Stranger avoids undermining his recommendation of such practice. However, for readers who have gone further, who have recognized the way bifurcation, even when it "hits upon forms" (262b), can conceal the essential character of the subject matter, the Stranger's reticence is provocative; it challenges them to step in and try to recognize for themselves the way in which that essential character reveals itself in the non-bifurcatory distinctions he presents. The key interpretive questions come into focus: if the Stranger's distinction of the fifteen traces the structure of reality

it?

### II. Five "unwritten teachings"<sup>4</sup>

itself, what is this structure, and what is the new mode of dialectic that is fit to seek

As a point of departure for interpreting the *Statesman* passages, I want to take Aristotle's "concise and summary" (988a18) report of Plato's teachings in *Metaphysics* A6. The teachings that Aristotle reports present an account of the structure of the whole of things. We will concentrate on these five claims:

#1: Forms and the dyad of the Great and the Small are conjointly the "causes" of "sensibles." Forms are "cause of what [a sensible thing] is," and the Great and the Small are "the underlying matter of which [forms] are predicated."

#2: The One and the dyad of the Great and the Small are conjointly the causes of the forms. The One is "cause of what [a form] is," and the Great and the Small are "the underlying matter of which [the One] is predicated."

#3: The One is cause of "good" (*to eu*); the Great and the Small, of "ill" (*to kakōs*).

#4: "Intermediate" (*metaxu*) between the timeless, unchanging, unique forms and the perishable, changing, many sensibles, there are "the mathematicals" (*ta mathematika*); these are intermediate because they are eternal and unchanging like the forms but many like sensibles (987b14–18).

#5: Forms are, but only in some limited sense, numbers. (My inclusion of this thesis and, too, its qualified character require immediate comment before we step back to look at the whole assemblage of teachings. First, by contrast with 1-4, nowhere in A6 does Aristotle expressly assert that forms are numbers. Only later, for example, 991b9-20, 1073a13ff., 1086a11ff., do we find him explicitly [albeit with varying degrees of certainty and clarity] crediting Plato with this claim. Nonetheless, it is strongly implied in A6 when Aristotle uses virtually identical language to say first that forms are "causes of everything else" [aitia . . . tois allois, 987b18-19] and then, only two sentences later, that numbers are "causes of the being of everything else" [aitious . . . tois allois tes ousias, 987b24-25]. At the same time, the identity needs to be qualified, for Aristotle has just credited Plato, in thesis 4, with the distinction of forms from mathematicals. Hence, my open-ended "in some limited sense." Even as we wonder if there are any traces of this teaching in the dialogues, we must hope that such traces, should we find them, will show us how to understand just what the teaching means.<sup> $\circ$ </sup>)

Needless to say, Aristotle's reports are anything but self-explaining. For us, there are two levels of questions to pursue. First, on the assumption that Aristotle is reporting, however summarily and in his own terms, genuine Platonic teachings, what is the structure of the whole that Plato articulates in them? Second, how do the closing distinctions in the *Statesman* relate to this structure? To the interpretive claim offered at the close of part 1, above, I want to add a second claim: in the closing distinctions in the *Statesman* is a *specific* exhibition of the *general* structure that Plato articulates in the "unwritten teachings." The main task of this paper is to make good on this second claim.

III. Related passages in the Parmenides and the Philebus<sup>6</sup>

Two sets of texts can help us interpret Aristotle's reports and, eventually, see the *Statesman*'s closing distinctions as an exhibition of them. These texts are accounts of participation offered in the third (with support in the second and the fifth) of the eight hypotheses on "the One" in the *Parmenides* and the accounts of dialectic and of the four kinds at 16c–18d and 23c–27c, respectively, in the *Philebus*. Here I shall try to distill what each, on my reading, provides.

### A. The account of participation in the *Parmenides*, hypothesis $3^7$

Each form is a simple and unique one that bestows composite unity on each of the many sensibles that participate in it. The form does this by imposing *peras*—that is, the internal and external "boundaries"<sup>8</sup> that divide and relate parts and so comprise a whole-upon a sensible substrate. That substrate is the in itself indeterminate magnitude, no more great than small, that only first gains existence when peras is imposed upon it. This imposition is, thus, a metaphysical, not physical, act: it is the form's exacting requirement of any sensible embodiment of it that this latter be structured in a determinate way as the whole of a determinate set of parts. In this formation of unformed magnitude, we can glimpse the first of the teachings that Aristotle reports. The indeterminate magnitude is the instantiation of the forms of size, Greatness and Smallness. Hence, forms-that is, in each case the perasproviding form—and the Great and the Small are conjointly responsible for sensibles. We can also glimpse the first part of the second teaching Aristotle reports. Each form, as a simple and unique one that bestows a lower grade of unity on what participates in it, is itself an instantiation of the One itself, or Unity, in its causal power. But this raises the question of how, as Aristotle reports in thesis 2, the Great and Small are involved in the being of the forms. And, of course, we have not yet addressed the third, fourth, and fifth teachings. On these issues, the two Philebus passages are helpful.9

#### B. The "gift from the gods," Philebus 16c-18d

In the first, Plato has Socrates introduce as a "gift from the gods" (16c) a new account of dialectical procedure or, as he later titles it, of "the distinguishing of forms" (*ten diairesin eidon*, 20c). We begin, Socrates says, by locating whatever we are studying within a "single form" (*mia idea*, 16d1), and we then go on to make a series of distinctions, first, of the "single form" into "two, if the case admits of there being two, otherwise [into] three or some other number [of forms]" (16d), then of each of these, and so on. We conclude only once we have come to recognize that "the one we started with" (*to kat'archas hen*) is not only "a one and an unlimited many," but also, between these extremes, "a limited many" (16d). These obscure

and schematic words are partly clarified by the two exemplary analyses Socrates offers, of musical sound at 17cff. and of the letter-sounds that comprise the alphabet at 18b-d. These analyses make clear that the "unlimited many" are arrayed as a continuum<sup>10</sup> framed by relative contraries and a midpoint. The midpoint, which represents an equal balance of the contraries, reveals that the other points on the continuum all mark out unequal balances.<sup>11</sup> (See, for illustrations, diagrams 2 and 4 in the appendix.) The "limited many" between the "single form" and the continuum are a set (or sets) of forms that are fit for interplay and comprise a whole that, when they are all well instantiated, yields a good instantiation of the "single form." In the music example, the "limited many" are the forms of the notes that fit together to comprise the various "modes" or scales.<sup>12</sup> (Socrates does not work this out in any detail; for an illustration of the kind of structure he appears to envisage, see diagram 3 in the appendix, a sketch of the Greater Perfect System in Greek harmonic theory.<sup>13</sup>) In the letter-sounds example, they are the forms of sounds that, because each can combine with certain of the others to make the syllables of speech, are the members of the alphabet. (Again, Socrates offers no detail; see diagram 5.)

#### C. Peras and apeiron in Philebus 23c-27c

In the second passage, we are given an occasion to deepen our understanding of the continuum structure and the relation of the limited but many forms to it. Socrates turns from dialectic and the eidetic order that it discloses, his focus at 16c–18d, to an account of the structure of "what now exists in the universe" (ta nun onta en toi panti, 23c4). He analyzes things as mixtures of two factors, peras and apeiron. The *apeiron* factor, he explains, is in each case a flux and contest between relative contraries; by itself, it is unregulated and unstable, with each opposite tending to exceed the other. The *peras* factor, in turn, is a ratio, a "relation of number to number or measure to measure" (25a8-b1). Applied to the apeiron, it has a twofold function. First, it fixes the relative quantity (to poson, 24c6) of the opposites, putting an end to their flux by determining just how much of each shall be present. Second, in doing this, it realizes "due measure" (to metrion, 24c7); the structure it establishes is therefore normative, a good apportionment and harmony (cf. summetra . . . kai symphona, 25e1) of the opposites. Socrates goes on to give a series of examples of the combination of peras and apeiron, including good health and seasonable weather and virtues of character. Of particular interest for us, at 26a, he once again cites musical order: "And as regards high and low, fast and slow, which are *apeira*, doesn't the introduction of these same things [namely, ratios that realize due measure] realize *peras* and constitute music as a whole in its perfection?" The implication is that the array of notes that make for beautiful

sound, sound that is on pitch, are a set of means, of normative apportionments of high and low.

This dovetails precisely with what Socrates taught at 16c-18d. There, we considered music from the perspective of the dialectician working out a "diairesis of forms" (20c), and we saw how the "single form," musical sound or pitch, implicates that definite set of forms that, making up a "mode" or scale, each pick out some definite place on the continuum of possible balances of high and low. Looking at musical notes as mixtures of *peras* and *apeiron*, we have learned to understand these notes as a normative set of good apportionments of high and low. Putting these thoughts together, we can see that these good apportionments just are the places on the continuum that the definite set of forms picks out. The whole structure that is emerging can be spelled out in three progressively expansive steps. Consider, first, each one of the limited number of forms: for each such form to pick out a place on the continuum of high and low is for it to exact, as a normative schema for its instantiation in actual sound, a definite ratio of the opposites. But no note is musical in isolation; each requires those others that go together with it to comprise a "mode" or scale. Hence, we can expand the first point: for each whole set of forms that defines a "mode" or scale to pick out a correlative set of places on the continuum is for it to exact, as a normative schema for its instantiation in actual sound, a definite set of ratios of the opposites. But, finally, each "mode" instantiates the "single form," musical sound or pitch; that no single note can be musical in isolation reflects the prior point that genuinely musical sound exists only in and as the interplay of notes that comprise a "mode." Thus, we can trace the causal necessity for the mixture of peras and apeiron back to "the one" that the new mode of dialectic explores, and we can rearticulate the whole structure with this in mind: for the "single form" to be well instantiated in actual sound requires that the limited number of forms it implicates themselves be instantiated by sounds that conform to the correlative set of ratios of opposites that these forms pick out on the continuum. (For a diagrammatic representation of this multileveled structure, see figure 6 in the appendix.)

D. Implications of the *Philebus* passages for the account of participation in the *Parmenides* 

The two Philebus passages bear on the Parmenides passage in two important ways.

#### (i) Forms of parts and the mathematical sense of peras

In the Parmenides, we saw, a thing's form constitutes it as a whole of parts by imposing a set of *perata*, "boundaries," on its otherwise indeterminate and unstructured magnitude. The Philebus permits us to make explicit two aspects of this that are left implicit in the *Parmenides*. First, for a form to give rise to wholepart structure in its participant requires that it implicate a plurality of forms of parts. This is the "limited many," the determinate set of forms between the "single form" and the unlimited many, in *Philebus* 16cff. Second, the sense of *peras* that Plato has Parmenides invoke in the *Parmenides*, that of boundary, bears within it the sense that he will have Socrates invoke in the *Philebus*, that of a ratio that realizes due measure. Boundaries establish both the relative places and the relative sizes of the parts that they bound. And boundaries that answer to a form will place and apportion these parts in a way that will make the whole they comprise a wellstructured and well-proportioned instantiation of that form. This implies, to put the point in the language of *Philebus* 23c–27c, that the form puts an end to the flux and contest between the possibilities of being greater and smaller. In implicating a set of forms of parts, it fixes just how great and just how small each of the parts should be, both in relation to one another and in relation to the whole they comprise.

#### (ii) The Great and Small and the apeiron

These last reflections expand our earlier recognition of the way the *peras*-providing form collaborates with the Great and the Small. The stress on the Great and the Small in the *Parmenides* stands in striking contrast to the way Plato has Socrates treat them in the *Philebus*. There, "greater and smaller" is but one pair of relative contraries among a number of others, all of which are said to be governed by more-and-less and to be members of the class of the *apeiron*. In the several lists of examples Socrates offers, he includes hotter and colder, drier and wetter, more and fewer, quicker and slower, and the musical contraries of high and low. In his synoptic remarks at 26a–b, moreover, he expands the range of possible continua to cover not only the physical (e.g., weather, strength, health), but also "a host of beautiful features found in our souls." Thus, magnitude, privileged in the *Parmenides*, emerges in the *Philebus* as but one case among others of a more general structure that is to be found in the spiritual as well as the material dimension of reality.

E. The five "unwritten teachings" in the Parmenides and the Philebus

These two observations give us occasion to recognize the presence in both the *Parmenides* and the *Philebus* of all five of the teachings Aristotle reports in *Metaphysics* A6.

(i) The Great and the Small as a case of the broader apeiron

The first thing we must do is to take explicit note of the privileged status of the Great and the Small in Aristotle's reports. One possibility is that Aristotle, speaking "concisely and summarily" (*syntomos kai kephalaiodos, Metaphysics* A7:988a18), honors a particularly important member of the *apeiron* class by giving its name to the class as a whole. The *Parmenides*, with the prominence it gives Greatness and Smallness, could be read as possible evidence that, in doing this, Aristotle is following Plato's own lead. But perhaps Aristotle focuses on the Great and the Small because his project in this part of *Metaphysics* A is to identify precursors to his own conception of the types of causality, in this case, of matter. Whatever his reason, when Aristotle speaks of the Great and the Small, he focuses narrowly on what for Plato is ultimately a broader notion; the partner principle with the One is the *apeiron*, and while the Great and the Small provide a clear exhibition of its dyadic form, the *apeiron* includes all the other pairs that are named or even suggested in the *Philebus* passage.

(ii) The five "unwritten teachings" in interplay

This said, we can now point to the presence of each of the five teachings:

#4: "Mathematicals." The Philebus passages have brought us to recognize the continuum and the select set of ratios that, in each case, the limited plurality of forms pick out on it. Continuum and ratio are essentially mathematical structures, and they are "intermediate" between sensibles and forms. If we consider the continuum in its relation to sensibles, however, it presents itself as abstract and different in kind from them. As the full range of ratios between opposites, the continuum is the totality of structures possible for sensibles; as pure possibilities, these ratios are not located in place and time. Hence, they are not subject to the flux that characterizes sensibles; as Aristotle says in A6, they are "eternal and unchanging" (987b16–17). Yet, they also lack the uniqueness of the forms and so are different in kind from them as well. Each continuum is an instantiation of some dyad of forms, and it bears, as an "unlimited many," an infinite number of abstract instances of each of these forms. The continuum presents, again in Aristotle's

words, "many like cases" (*poll' atta homoia*) whereas the forms are "in each case one alone" (*hen hekaston monon*, 987b17).

#5: The identity of forms and numbers. We can now recognize a nonreductionist way to interpret teaching 5. The select set of ratios is a "relation of number to number." The limited plurality of forms picks these out, and the "single form" calls for this limited plurality of forms. If we make a distinction between the nature that a form is and its causal power,<sup>14</sup> we can say that in the first respect forms are not, and in the second respect they are, identical with numbers. Even while forms and the ratios they call for are (as thesis 4 asserts) ontologically different in kind, in their causal power, forms are functionally equivalent to these ratios. In picking them out on the continuum, forms *express themselves as* numbers.

#1: Forms and the apeiron. We saw from the Parmenides that a form provides the boundaries that structure the indeterminate magnitude—itself the concrete instantiation of the Great and the Small—as a composite sensible thing. And we have seen that the Great and the Small is but one member of the class of the *apeiron*. So, we can also see that (to restate Aristotle's report of thesis 1 with the general notion of the *apeiron* in place of the specific case of it, the Great and the Small) forms and the *apeiron* are conjointly causes of sensibles.

*#2: The One and the* apeiron. We can also see what the forms presuppose in order to accomplish this causal work. To provide boundaries is to make a whole of parts, and this is to bestow unity. But, as we noted, to bestow unity is to instantiate the One or Unity itself in its causal power. These boundaries, in turn, apportion the parts to one another; but this is to fix the proportions of the opposites that pertain to these parts by the selection of a set of ratios on the continuum framed by those opposites. In our three examples, these select sets are ratios of greater and smaller on the continuum of possible magnitude, ratios of high and low on the continuum of possible pitch (see, again, diagram 2), and ratios of voiced and muted on the continuum of speech sound (see diagram 4). Each of these continua is an abstract instantiation of the *apeiron*. Thus, for the form to be a cause of sensibles requires both the instantiation of the One (this instantiation is the "single form" in its bestowal of unity on its sensible participants) and the instantiation of the *apeiron* (this is the continuum); hence, the One and the *apeiron* are conjointly causes of the forms in their being as causes of sensibles.<sup>15</sup>

#3: The normative status of the select set of ratios. The task of bringing to focus how the One is responsible for good and the *apeiron* for ill gives us an occasion to articulate as a whole the causal hierarchy we have been retracing. The One is instantiated in a "single form's" bestowal of unity on the in itself indeterminate that its participant otherwise would be. A "single form" bestows unity by implicating a set of forms of parts, each of which marks out a ratio on the relevant continuum of opposites. These ratios establish the proportion of the

opposites that is appropriate to each part of the whole in its relations to the other parts and to the whole. But "the appropriate" (*to prepon*, one of the names for the mean at *Statesman* 284e6) is a normative notion; a sensible whose parts conform to these ratios will be good, that is, a good embodiment of the "single form." Hence, the One, insofar as it is responsible for the "single form's" bestowal of unity, is also responsible for the good.<sup>16</sup> The *apeiron*, however, is the counter-principle to the Good. In its abstract instantiation as the continuum, it is in itself indifferent to the priority of one possibility over another that is implied by the selection of a normative set of ratios. And in its concrete instantiation as the indeterminate substrate that the boundaries first structure, it is an unchecked flux and contest between the opposites. Hence, when the parts of a thing exceed or fall short of the ratios set by the forms of the parts, it is the *apeiron* factor in the thing that is expressed and that is in this sense the ultimate cause.

## IV. The exhibition of the "unwritten teachings" in the diairesis of the fifteen kinds of art in the *Statesman*

In the context created by these reflections, we can begin to see what Plato is doing in having the Eleatic Stranger lay out his distinction of the fifteen kinds of art at the close of the *Statesman*. The Stranger practices the new mode of dialectic that Socrates introduces at *Philebus* 16c–18d. The fifteen are anything but a mere list. On the contrary, they constitute a specimen case of the ultimate ontological order that Aristotle reports Plato to have articulated in the "unwritten teachings." We can now bring this order into view by three related sets of observations. (For a diagrammatic representation of the field of relations laid bare by the Stranger's distinctions, see figure 8 in the appendix. It is by reflection on this field that, in the next three sections, we shall try to bring to view the order articulated in the "unwritten teachings.")

A. The One and its instantiation in the "single form": "Care"

Is there present and at work in the Stranger's distinction of the fifteen the "single form" that Socrates in the *Philebus* says we must find as the first step in the new mode of dialectic? And does it, a simple and unique form, instantiate the One in bestowing unity of a lower grade on what otherwise would lack it? There is indeed a "single form"; it is *epimeleia* (276b), the "care" for itself that the Eleatic Stranger finds, in light of his myth of the ages, each human community must take up as its fundamental task. If the overt claim of the myth is that no god or daimon is at hand to "care" for the needs of human beings, its implicit point is that this is a task not for any despotic shepherd of the people, but for the community as a whole, to be

shared and accomplished by the coordinated practices of the arts. But this is to say, to recast the Stranger's anthropological point in terms of the ontology of the *Philebus*, that the "single form" "care" requires for its instantiation the instantiation of a limited plurality of forms, the fifteen kinds of art. These fifteen are the analogues to the forms of notes that comprise the musical "modes" and, again, to the forms of the letter-sounds that make up syllables and words. The Stranger implies this from the beginning, when, first alerting young Socrates to the need to abandon bifurcatory diairesis, he says that they must divide the kinds of art "*kata mele . . . hoion hiereion*," (*limb by limb . . .* like a sacrificial animal, 287c3). The analysis of "care" involves recognizing which are the kinds that, like "limbs," are fit for interplay, fit to comprise, in their "organic" relations, a cooperative whole.

# B. The apeiron and its instantiation in the continuum traced by the series of fifteen *kinds*

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On our interpretation of number 2 of the five teachings, however, the One exercises its causal responsibility conjointly with the *apeiron*; the One's instantiation in a "single form" that bestows unity presupposes a continuum on which the forms of parts pick out ratios. Do we find the abstract instantiation of the *apeiron* in a continuum between opposites in the Stranger's final distinctions? The more closely we study the fifteen, the more evident the underlying continuum.

#### (i) The list as a series

The Stranger makes explicit the *serial* or *gradual* character of his distinctions. At each step, he marks the distance of the kind he is distinguishing from the sought-for form of statesmanship. By the specificity of his negations, as well as by his pointed revision of the order of the arts in his synopsis of the first seven at 289a, he makes clear that he is moving stepwise and gradually from the arts most remote from statesmanship, through those closer to it, toward statesmanship itself.<sup>17</sup>

#### (ii) The opposites and midpoint

The series he traces, moreover, has the genuine *bipolarity* and *midpoint* that characterize the sample continua Socrates cited in the *Philebus*. At the one extreme stands the kinds of art that provide the raw materials, the physical stuff, for the subsequent shaping into things by the next kinds of art. At the other extreme stands statesmanship proper, with its preeminent concern, made explicit in the final pages of the dialogue (305e–311c), for the formation of good character. Thus, the

opposites that frame the continuum are the material and the spiritual aspects of the life of the community. At the midpoint, in turn, stands the eighth kind, the art of the slave. Slaves are both "possessions" (cf. *ktetous*, 289d10) and agents. As agents, they belong to the second set of seven arts, the arts of service, in contrast with the first set of seven, the arts that produce things. But as "possessions," they are like things and stand as "the opposite" (*tounantion*, 289d7) to the statesman. In this double status, the art of slaves is analogous to the middle kinds that Socrates picked out in his diaireses of music and letter-sounds in the *Philebus*, "even-toned" pitch and sounds "not voiced but having a certain noise." Each of the three marks an equal proportion of the relevant opposites.

#### (iii) The continuum of proportions of material and spiritual

Finally, once we recognize the poles and mid-point, the continuum traced by the remaining kinds of art becomes fully evident. Each of the fifteen strikes a distinctive balance of the material and the spiritual in the specific way that it "cares" for the life of the community.<sup>18</sup> In the first seven (the "contributory arts"), the material dominates the spiritual-but in decreasing proportion as we approach the midpoint. In the final seven (the "directly responsible arts"), the spiritual dominates the material—and in increasing proportion as we approach statesmanship. Any attempt at a detailed commentary would go beyond the limits of this discussion, but I will indicate the way in which the proportions of material and spiritual shift as we move from each kind of art to the next. Notice, first, how the series moves from arts that produce physical stuff (no. 1 on figure 7 in the appendix) to arts that transform this into determinate things designed to produce (no. 2), then to preserve (no. 3), then to bear and transport (no. 4) other things. The vehicles made by the fourth kind of art, however, can also transport persons; hence, this kind is transitional to the next three kinds, which produce things, not for other things, but for persons, albeit in their physical being. These are the arts that produce physical protections (no. 5), ornaments and sensory diversions (no. 6), and nourishment of all sorts (no. 7). Notice, next, how the last series moves from what is relatively external to persons in their physical being (for instance, in no. 4, ships and wagons, and in no. 5, walls and armor and clothes), to what actually makes up their physical being (in no. 7, food as it becomes part of the body [288e] and exercise, which is itself the body's own activity). Hence, the series leads gradually into the midpoint, the art of the slave (no. 8), for a slave produces his own body's activity in order to serve. The next three kinds of art, those of merchants and traders (no. 9), of clerks and heralds (no. 10), and of priests and diviners (no. 11), trace the continuum from the economic deeds of distributing material goods, through the administrative deeds of recording and regulating such distribution, to the

conventional-spiritual deeds of directing the city's public ritual practices and, so, cultivating traditional piety. From this (after the lengthy interruption by the Stranger's reflections on types of factional rule and the function of law), the series moves into the kinds of art that care most fully for the spiritual, that is, the good character of the citizens. Now the Stranger leads from the rhetoric (no. 12) that sustains the citizens' acceptance of the statesman's wise rule (that is, to recall the moral psychology of the *Republic*, their *temperance*), through the generalship (no. 13) that, deferring to the statesman's decision whether or not to go to war (and so, again, cultivating *temperance*), sustains the citizens' readiness to fight (and so their *courage*), through the judge's ability (no. 14) to preserve the law and the harmony for which it aims between the different groups of citizens (that is, their *justice*), to, finally, statesmanship itself (no. 15), which consists in the *wisdom* that directs the cultivation of temperance, courage, and justice in the citizenry.

C. The normative status of the ratios on the continuum—the city with the fifteen kinds of art as sacred

If the reflections in sections A and B are well taken, then the One is instantiated in the way the "single form" "care" bestows unity on actual cities that participate in and embody it. This bestowal involves a complex set of relations: "care" implies a limited plurality of forms of parts, the fifteen kinds of art, each of which marks off, on the continuum between the material and the spiritual, some definite proportion (or range of proportions) of these opposites to one another. But, as we have seen, the continuum is, as a series of possible proportions, an abstract instantiation of the dyadic apeiron. Hence, the One and the apeiron are conjointly responsible for the "single form's" being the cause of sensibles, that is, for "care's" causal role for actual cities. The one step remaining for us is to mark the normative force of the select set of ratios—and thereby of the limited number of forms, and *thereby* of the "single form"-for actual cities. For in this we bring to focus the way in which, ultimately, the One is responsible for "good." The Stranger indicates that he intends his series of fifteen to express a normative order with his allusion to the sacred at 287c3: as cited in section A (but with a different stress), he introduces his distinctions by telling Young Socrates that they must divide the kinds of art "kata mele ... hoion hiereion" (limb by limb ... like a sacrificial animal). Sacrifice was made both to please the gods and to entreat their good will. To be worthy of them and win their favor, the hiereion must be perfectly formed, and the ritual dismemberment must respect and reveal this perfection.<sup>19</sup> The Stranger's simile therefore suggests that in his diairesis he will lay out the "limbs" or parts that, in their capacity for interplay, make for the perfectly formed city.<sup>20</sup>

To see the normative status of the Stranger's diairesis more specifically, we would need to reflect on each of the fifteen kinds of art in concrete detail. In this limited space, I can only sketch the character of such a reflection.<sup>21</sup> The key questions to pursue would be the same in kind as in the cases of the exemplary diaireses of musical notes and of letter-sounds in the *Philebus*. First, focusing on any one of the fifteen, we should ask what other kinds of art it requires in order to fulfill its function. And, second, as the possible combinations (the analogues to the modal sets in all their variants in the case of music and to the various possible syllables in the case of the letter-sounds) begin to emerge, we should ask whether a city without the full web of physical and spiritual activities that these combinations enable would be "caring" for itself as well as it can and should. What we will find is that, even while some of the kinds of art, viewed in isolation, seem unimportant (does a well-formed city really need, for example, the container-making arts?), each requires and is required by various others. Thus, the distribution of material goods presupposes the work of preserving and moving them, and all of these tasks require raw materials and tools; again, defending the city requires not only good generalship, but also strong walls and a healthy citizenry; still again, the basic cooperation involved both in distribution and in defense presupposes the shared values that are cultivated in public rites and sourced in the education for which, in different respects, the arts of the rhetor, the judge, and the law-making statesman are responsible. The more we probe, the more compelling becomes the Stranger's implicit claim that the presence and absence of such combinations-and, so, of the full set of "limbs" that are variously at work in them-makes the difference between good and bad cities, that is, between good and bad political instantiations of "care."

#### V. Implications

In closing, I want to make explicit several different sorts of implications. I began by observing that the *Statesman* offers itself to its Academic readers, in particular, as an exemplary exhibition of the stages through which the process of philosophical education should lead. We have now found, in its closing non-bifurcatory dialectic, a specific exhibition of the ontological order that Plato articulates (according to Aristotle's report) in the "unwritten teachings." The presence of this exhibition implies that, for the Plato who wrote the *Statesman*, coming to see this ontological order is a long-term goal of the process of philosophical education. To say this is to acknowledge emphatically the importance of the "unwritten teachings."

This observation should underscore, not diminish, the importance of the dialogues. Not only have we found the "unwritten teachings" in three Platonic writings—the passages in the *Parmenides, Philebus,* and *Statesman*. By exploring

their presence in these passages, we have been able to work out the first outlines of an interpretation of those teachings.<sup>22</sup>

This brings to the fore a question and, with it, a crucial choice. What do we make of the "fact" that the "unwritten teachings" are, on our reading, written? What is the status of the writings in which we have found them suggested? The options facing us range between two extremes. On the one hand, three passages may have a double character: for those outside the Academy, they are, at most, an exoteric presentation, deeply veiled, while for those who have heard and studied the teachings face-to-face with Plato within the Academy, they function as hypomnemata, allusive "reminders." This possibility might be developed on the basis of a straightforward reading of the famous criticism of writing in the *Phaedrus* On the other hand, one interpretation of the situation may take seriously the evidence that the Statesman (and, in fact, a number of the later dialogues) mirrors with mimetic irony the teaching situation in the Academy.<sup>23</sup> Does the failure to think philosophically that is represented in the dramatic action of the dialogue by Young Socrates' authoritarian agreements and unquestioning leaps reflect problems of communication and understanding in the Academy itself? Is it, indeed, in response to such problems that Plato writes the Statesman? If so, if, that is, Plato felt the need to communicate indirectly even within the Academy, then the privileging of face-to-face conversation and the projection of the "unwritten teachings" as its straightforward content become problematic.<sup>24</sup> Instead. conversation in the Academy and the dialogues will be, in effect, embedded in one another, and our hermeneutics will have to be thoroughly dialectical.<sup>25</sup>

### Supplementary diagrams

1. Schema for bifurcatory diairesis ("halving"):



2. Initial distinctions in the first example of non-bifurcatory diairesis in the *Philebus*—musical sounds:

"sound as treated by music," that is, pitch "the original one": / | \ "high" "even-toned" "l "low" h>l ----- h=l ----- h<l

#### 3. The Greater Perfect System

the seven species of the octave (i.e., scales formed by notes selected from the double octave laid out as two conjunct tetrachords plus a completing note):



(Note: Each of the baseline tetrachords is in the enharmonic genus: the intervals are two tones, quarter tone, quarter tone. The species of the octave differ from each other by virtue of the different sequences of these intervals that each has.)

4. Initial distinctions in the second example of non-bifurcatory diairesis in the *Philebus*—letter-sounds:

"the	VS.	"others vs.	"the	
voiceu		but having	and noiseless"	
		a certain noise"		
the unlimited plurality of	ł			
uttered sound	d:	(maximal	 )	(maximal
		release of breading	,	catting on of breath)

5. Possible reconstruction of the full diairesis of letter-sounds in the *Philebus*:

the single form:		"letter" (stoic		
	/		\	
"the	VS.	"others	VS.	"the
voiced"	,	not voiced		not voiced

	but having	and noiseless"
	a certain noise"	
/   \	/   \	/   \

the limited number of "ones":

[the various letter-sounds]

the continuum of uttered sound:

(maximal release	(maximal cutting off
of breath)	of breath)

6. General schema for non-bifurcatory diairesis in the Philebus:

the "single form":	Х							
	/		/				١	\
the limited plurality of forms:	А	&	В	&	С	&	D	<b>&amp;</b> E
<i>the "unlimitedly many,"</i> that is, the continuum between opposites, and the set of normative balances (that is, the set of limits) that the forms								
A & B & C & D & E pick out:					-			
Opposite							(	Opposite

the particulars in place and time that, to instantiate the "single form" well, must embody the various normative balances picked out by A & B & C & D & E.

7. The continuum of the fifteen kinds of art in the *Statesman*:

1,	2, 3, 4,	5, 6, 7,	8,	9, 10, 11,	12, 13, 14,	15
rm,	t, c, v,	d, a, n,	sl,	m, c, p,	r, g, j,	st

(concerned with the

(concerned with the

material life of the city)

spiritual life of the city)

of the city)

8. The distinction of the fifteen kinds of art in the *Statesman*, represented as a case of the new mode of nonbifurcatory diairesis introduced in the *Philebus* at 16cff.:



of the city)

particulars in place and time:

the arts in any actual city that—to instantiate well the "single form," "care," and so constitute a good city—must embody the various normative balances picked out by the fifteen kinds

#### NOTES:

1. David Lachterman was a midwife for this logos. He was a master of generous and searching conversation, and it was his open-spirited questions that first encouraged me to pursue the web of connections between Aristotle's report of Plato's teachings regarding the One and the dyad and my readings of the *Statesman* and the *Parmenides* (see notes 2 and 6, below). It is a terrible loss not to be able to go on talking with him.

2. The Stranger has stressed the importance of bifurcatory diairesis in at least three ways: (1) Every cut he has made, from the beginning of the Sophist up until Statesman 287b, has been bifurcatory. (2) His two paradigms of diairesis—the divisions that isolate the angler in the Sophist (218e-221c) and the weaver in the Statesman (279b-283b)-are bifurcatory. (3) When Young Socrates makes the lopsided cut of human from beast at *Statesman* 262a, the Stranger objects, arguing that "by cutting down the middle [dia meson ... temnontas] ... one is more likely to hit upon forms" and telling Young Socrates that "it is this that makes all the difference in inquiries" (262b). As models of cutting down the middle, the Stranger cites odd/even and male/female. Each of these cuts exhausts the class it divides by sorting its members according to contrary forms into mutually exclusive subclasses. (For a simple diagram, useful for purposes of contrasting the two modes of diairesis, see figure 1.) At the same time, the Stranger has also intimated the limitations of bifurcatory diairesis in the strange passage at 264b-266e in which, with a series of pointedly ironic jokes, he completes the initial series of distinctions in a way that misses fundamentally the essence of statesmanship. For discussion, see my The Philosopher in Plato's "Statesman" (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1980), pp. 16-33.

3. On the mimetic irony of the *Statesman* and the persona "Young Socrates," see *ibid.*, pp. xiv–xvii, 5–8. On Young Socrates's mistakes, see 20–22, 24–26, 54–57, 59, 64–65. On the exemplary character of the course of inquiry in the *Statesman* for the Academicians, see 69–70, 79–82, 115–117.

4. The phrase is Aristotle's at *Physics* 209b14–15. I should say at the outset what is obvious in any case: I am not attempting to canvass all the "unwritten teachings." Indeed, I have not even exhausted Aristotle's report in *Metaphysics* A6; I have omitted his report of Plato's derivation of number from the One and the dyad of the Great and the Small. Though I think there is indirect evidence in the *Parmenides* attesting this as a genuine Platonic teaching, it is not relevant to the present project. Nor do I mean to suggest that the only exhibition of "unwritten teachings" in the *Statesman* comes at 287b–291a and 303d–305e. On the contrary, I find generally persuasive H. J. Krämer's view (*Arete bei Platon und Aristoteles. Zum Wesen und zur Geschichte der Platonischen Ontologie*, in *Abhandlungen der Heidelberger Akademie der Wissenschaften*, *philosophisch-historische Klasse*, *Jahrgang* 1959, 6, Heidelberg, 1959, pp. 148–177, especially 163) that the "unwritten teachings" are on display in the Stranger's account of the mean at 284a–e and in his use of it in the final phase of the dialogue (305e–311c) to locate the virtues on a continuum of vigor and gentleness. But I have to reserve discussion of that for another occasion.

6. A key study for anyone interested in the problem of the "unwritten teachings" is Kenneth Sayre's Plato's Late Ontology: A Riddle Resolved (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983). That I have major disagreements with his interpretations of the Parmenides (see my Plato's Parmenides: The Conversion of the Soul [Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986; paperback, University Park, Pa.: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1991], Preface, n 6) and of the "unwritten teachings" themselves (see [1] and [2] in note 15, below) does not diminish my appreciation of the effect of his work. By arguing forcefully for readings of the Parmenides and the Philebus which let the "unwritten teachings" appear in the dialogues, he has altered the status quaestionis, freeing us from having to choose between affirming an esoteric doctrine not presented by the dialogues (the position, in essence, of the early work of Krämer, cited in note 4, above, and Gaiser) and rejecting Aristotle's reports as a basic misinterpretation (the position argued by Harold Cherniss in The Riddle of the Early Academy [Berkeley: University of California Press, 1945]). Another recent work which also tends to undermine this choice, in this case by arguing for the compatibility of affirming the "unwritten teachings" with Schleiermacher's hermeneutics, is T. A. Szlezak, Platon und die Schriftlichleit der Philosophie. Interpretationen zu den frühen und mittleren Dialogen (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1985).

7. The following paragraph summarizes the interpretation I have worked out at length and within the context of an interpretation of the *Parmenides* as a whole in my *Plato's* "*Parmenides*" (cited in note 6, above). On the constitution of sensibles, see especially the discussion of 157b–158d in hypothesis 3 on pages 126–136, together with the discussions of 149d–151b in 2 on pages 105–111 and of 161a–e in 5 on pages 143–146. For the way this exhibits "unwritten teaching" 1 and the first part of 2, see Ch. 5, n 29 (but note my revision of [5] there in part 3.E.ii, below). Note: For a more expansive treatment, especially of the implicit presence of teachings 3–5 in the *Parmenides*, see now my "'Unwritten Teachings' in the *Parmenides*," *Review of Metaphysics* 48.3 (March 1995), pp. 591–633.

8. The concrete meaning of *peras* is "boundary" or "delimiting extremity," and it is in just this sense that *Parmenides* uses the word throughout the hypotheses (see 137d6, 145a1, 165a5). This sets the usages of the *Parmenides* and of the *Philebus*, where *peras* has a mathematical sense (see section C, below), into contrast. For the reconciliation of these usages, see section D.i, below.

9. The following sections, B and C, are compressed rethinkings of analyses made at length in my "The God-Given Way" (*Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy*, 6 [1990], pp. 323–359), pp. 325–340.

<sup>5.</sup> I do not think that the reported distinction between mathematical and eidetic or ideal numbers can be used to resolve the tension in thesis 5. I cannot go into the obscure issue of the nature of eidetic number here. I hope it sufficient for the moment to note that Aristotle makes no allusion to the distinction in A6; quite the contrary, he claims that Plato "agreed" with the Pythagoreans "in making the numbers the cause of the being of other things" (987b24–25), and it seems evident that the Pythagoreans—who, Aristotle says, did not separate numbers from sensibles and who had no notion of forms (987b29–33)—had numbers in a mathematical sense in mind.

11. Thus, on my reading, the "unlimited many" are not the many sensibles that instantiate some form. As places on the continuum, they are the full range of possible proportions of the opposites that sensible instantiations may have.

12. Isobel Henderson ("Ancient Greek Music," chap. 9, pp. 336–403, in Egon Wellesz ed., *Ancient and Oriental Music*, vol. 1 of *The New Oxford History of Music* (London: Oxford University Press, 1957), points out that the identification of "modes" (*harmoniai*) with "species of the octave" and so, for us, with scales is made not by "classical composers and . . . musically intelligent prose-writers," but only by "musically ignorant theorists" (p. 347). I accept the judgment of most translators (e.g., Hackforth, Gosling, Waterfield) in taking *harmoniai* at 17d4 to mean "scales" because it is mathematicizing harmonic theorists—the phrase *hoi prosthen* ("the men of old") at 17d2 presumably refers to the Pythagoreans—whom Socrates cites as his authorities at *Philebus* 17c–d.

13. Fourth-century harmonic theory mapped out the matrix of possible intervals and notes implied by the various tunings in three systems, the Greater Perfect System, the Lesser Perfect System, and the Perfect Immutable System. See Giovanni Comotti, Music in Greek and Roman Culture (tr. by R. Munson, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989), chap. 5; Henderson, op. cit., pp. 344-346. The Greater Perfect System covers a double octave, structuring it as two conjunct tetrachords with a detached note added on. Each conjunct tetrachord picks out seven notes, with the first and the seventh and the shared fourth in fixed positions and the two inner notes within each tetrachord movable in a variety of ways. The central position of the first note of the second conjunct tetrachord is made explicit by its name, the mese ("middle"). For a diagrammatic representation, see figure 3 in the appendix. I have singled out the Greater Perfect System as a display of the sort of harmonic structure Socrates suggests at 17c-d because, as the analysis in part 4, below, will put us in position to see, it is strikingly isomorphic with the Eleatic Stranger's structuring of the continuum of the arts in *Statesman* 287b–291a and 303d–305e. This isomorphism may be mere coincidence. In contrast, if it is the new mode of dialectic introduced by Socrates at Philebus 16c-18d that the Eleatic Stranger puts into practice at Statesman 287b-291a and 303d-305e, then, since Socrates offers harmonic structures as a paradigm for the order disclosed by the new mode of dialectic, it may be that Plato actually looked to the Greater Perfect System as a model in composing the Stranger's structuring of the continuum of the arts in the Statesman.

14. For evidence and argument that Plato makes this distinction in the *Parmenides*, see my *Plato's "Parmenides"* (cited in note 6, above), chap. 4.C.1 and 5.B.2.b, especially pp. 154–155.

15. I will here note two distinctive features of this reconstruction of the sense of the "unwritten teachings": (1) On my reading, what Aristotle reports is not an account of how forms are themselves derived from the One and the dyad. What a form gains from its participation in the One is its simplicity and uniqueness and—in a repetition, on the level of

<sup>10.</sup> J. C. B. Gosling's reflections on the presence of the notion of the continuum both in 16c–18d and in 23c–27c in *Plato: Philebus* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), pp. 165–181, 196–206, are seminal for my reading.

the form, of the One's bestowal of simplicity and uniqueness on it—its causal power to bestow unity on the sensibles that participate in it; what it gains from its collaboration with the apeiron is the continuum on which, in accomplishing its bestowal of unity on its participants, the forms of parts it implicates pick out the select set of ratios. What stands logically (not, of course, temporally) prior to all this is the determinate nature itself that the form essentially is. In this sense, it is not the nature that the form essentially is, but only the causal power that it has for which the One and the apeiron are conjointly responsible. (Note that this reading saves the "unwritten teachings" from a damaging obscurity. If we derive the forms themselves from the One and the apeiron, then we must find the basis for the determinateness of each of the forms in these principles. But the One and the *apeiron* are general in character. To bring out the problem in an exemplary way: though we can find in the uniqueness of each form a respect in which it instantiates the One itself, we cannot appeal to the One itself to explain the determinate nature itself that each form, in its uniqueness, is.) (2) The distinction between the nature that the form essentially is and the causal power that it has frees us, in what I take to be a genuinely Platonic way, from the customary choice between taking the form to be separate and taking it to be immanent. The nature is underived and transcendent, but its causal power gives it, in its expression as the ratios that structure the sensible, immanence. Traditional two-world readings and the more recent efforts to deny the separateness of the forms (see, for a powerful articulation of the latter position, Sayre, op. cit., especially chap. 3, part 5) each capture only one of these two aspects of the forms.

16. In this way, the formal causal force of the One coincides with that of the Good. Is this the basis for, and so a key to the interpretation of, the identification of the Good with the One that Aristoxenus appears to report in his famous comment on Plato's lecture on the Good? For seminal discussions, see Krämer, *op. cit.*; Sayre, *op. cit.*; and Rafael Ferber, *Platos Idee des Guten* (Academia Verlag Richarz, Sankt Augustin, 1989 [second edition]).

17. This use of the negatives to indicate the serial character of the list is detailed in my "The God-Given Way" (cited in note 9, above), p. 348, n 29.

18. With this vision of the continuum, central to the *Statesman*, in mind, it is striking to read the following passage at *Timaeus* 87c–e: "Everything which is good is beautiful (*kalon*), and the beautiful is not without proportion (*ouk ametron*), and the animal which is to be beautiful must have due proportion (*summetron*). Now we perceive lesser symmetries or proportions and reason about them, but of the most basic and greatest (*kuriõtata kai megista*) we take no heed, for with regard to health and disease, virtue and vice, there is no proportion or lack of it (*summetria kai ametria*) that is greater than that between soul and body themselves. But we do not perceive this, nor do we reflect that when a weak or inferior frame is the vehicle of a soul that is strong and in all ways great or, conversely, when an inferior soul is fit together with a strong body, then the animal as a whole is not beautiful, for it lacks the most important of all symmetries. However, the animal that is in the opposite condition (that is, that has due proportion of mind and body) is the most beautiful and loveliest of all sights to him who has eyes to see" (My translation, with the help of those of Benjamin Jowett and R. G. Bury).

19. Walter Burkert, *Greek Religion* (tr. John Raffan, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1985), describes how "the bones are laid on the pyre prepared on the alter in just order. In Homer, beginnings from all limbs of the animal, small pieces of meat, are also placed on the pyre: the dismembered creature is to be reconstituted symbolically" (p. 57).

20. Notice, too, the characterizations of the city as united by the "divine" (*theion*) bond of "divine" (*theian*) true opinion, and, so as itself "daimonic" (*daimonioi*), at 309c3, c7, and c8, respectively.

21. For an example of such a reflection, see my "The God-Given Way" (cited in note 9, above), pp. 354–356.

22. Needless to say, the account we have arrived at so far must be expanded and deepened in key respects. Interpretation of the dialogues will, I hope, continue to prove to be the key. As an indication of the sorts of conceptual issues that we need to think through as we interpret, consider just these four questions. (1) The Good and the One. What relation between the One and the Good is implied by the normative status of the forms and the ratios that have the One as their ultimate source? Does it run counter to the nature that the One itself is for it to coincide in its causal power with the Good, or counter to the nature that the Good itself is for it to coincide in its causal power with the One? (see note 16, above). (2) The Unity of the forms. Is it consistent with the simplicity of the form that when it does the work of the "single form" (Philebus 16c), it implicates a limited plurality of forms that, in interplay like "limbs" (Statesman 287c), make up a whole? (I have argued for the necessity of both simplicity and whole-part structure in related contexts in Plato's "Parmenides" [cited in note 6, above], pp. 179–183, and in "Unity and Logos: A Reading of Theaetetus 201c-210a," Ancient Philosophy 12 [1992], pp. 87-111.) (3) The nature of the mathematicals. How are we to interpret the notions of ratio and number that the relation of the forms and the continuum requires? The continuum can be reconstructed in different ways, depending, for example, on whether we key from the relative sizes of parts (the starting-point suggested by some of the language of the Parmenides) or from the notion that the equality of the opposites defines a midpoint (the starting-point suggested by the music example in the *Philebus* and by other language of the *Parmenides*). Of seminal value for the sorts of questions to be investigated here are D. H. Fowler, The Mathematics of Plato's Academy: A New Reconstruction (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987), and David Lachterman, The Ethics of Geometry: A Genealogy of Modernity (New York: Routledge, 1989). (4) The heterogeneity of the opposites. The preceding question is complicated by the different kinds of opposites that we include as cases of the dyad. The four kinds passage in the *Philebus* complicates matters in an initial way when, after establishing that the pairs of opposites that belong to the apeiron are governed by more-and-less, it goes on to include those opposites whose determination establishes the beautiful features of souls (26b). Our Statesman passages complicate matters even further when, on our reading, they pair material and spiritual themselves as opposites. (This is not unique to the Statesman. Recall Timaeus 87ce, quoted in note 18, above.) How does it bear on our notion of ratio that the terms

apportioned to each other can be (roughly speaking) material, spiritual, or material and spiritual?

<sup>23.</sup> I have developed this view in *The Philosopher in Plato's "Statesman,*" cited in note 2.

<sup>24.</sup> For discussion of the problems involved, see Stanley Rosen's *Introduction to Plato's Symposium* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987), second edition, pp. xxxix–lvii.

<sup>25.</sup> Earlier versions of this essay were presented at the Third Plato Symposium, sponsored by the International Plato Society, in Bristol, England, August 1992, in colloquia at Vassar College and Boston University in April 1993, and as a Franklin J. Matchette Lecture at the Catholic University of America in November 1993. I owe special thanks to Rachel Kitzinger and John McCleary for philological and mathematical suggestions and to Jennifer Church, Jesse Kalin, Michael McCarthy, Michael Murray, Uma Narayan, Jeff Turner, and Doug Winblad for valuable discussions.