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THE IMPLICIT LOGIC OF HESIOD'S COSMOGONY:
AN EXAMINATION OF THEOGONY, 116-133*

MITCHELL H. MILLER, JR.

This discussion of Hesiod's cosmogony is inspired by several striking obscurities in the poet's major cosmogonic statement, Theogony 116-133. These center around a curious inconsistency in Hesiod's speech. At 116-122 he tells how Chaos "was the very first to come-into-being (πρώτος γένος τι)," followed by Earth, Tartaros, and Eros. The Theogony, of course, is an effort to integrate everything into an embracing genealogical order; hence it is natural to understand the sense of "come-into-being" (γένος) as "be born." Yet as soon as we do so, problems arise. To state the 'obvious': to be born is to be begotten by a parent. Is there, then, an implicit parent for Earth, Tartaros, and Eros? And are the latter thereby kin to one another? It would be extraordinary if the first four were not to be understood in terms of familial relations — every being named in the Theogony after 116-122 is explicitly integrated into its genealogical order. On the other hand, it remains the fact that Hesiod does not expressly associate the four as kin. Is there a reason for this? Is Hesiod's speech merely elliptical — or does his silence reflect some insight or special intention?

It is important to acknowledge at the very outset that, apart from the specific issues indicated in these questions, there is also the basic issue of whether these questions ought to be raised at all. According to one rather widespread view of Hesiod, they are quite inappropriate to the purely mythopoetic mentality of his work. On this view, Hesiod is not a systematic thinker, and "serious speculation ... plays very little part in [his] Theogony." Therefore, questions which press beyond what is explicitly said and search for implicit subsurface meaning or reflective insight risk turning Hesiod into something he was not.

Though it serves a valuable cautionary role, there are several reasons why this view ought not to be accepted outright. First, there is the obvious problem that if it is, precisely the sort of inquiry which can test it will be pre-empted. Secondly, as we shall see in more detail later, it would be unjustified to regard the Theogony as all of one piece, so far as reflective or speculative depth is concerned: parts of the work seem very primitive, or "innocent of philosophy," indeed, while others do not. Finally, and in this connection, the passage which immediately precedes and sets the context for the cosmogonic statement gives evidence of a highly reflective Hesiod. Lines 1-115 make up the famous proem, in which Hesiod, by a succession of shifts from the more familiar and derivative to the more remote and original, moves his hearer's attention from (i) his own encounter with the Muses of Helicon to (ii) their source, Zeus, and his kingdom of Olympian gods to (iii) the cosmic 'powers' which have generated these and upon which they depend. Within this highly structured movement, Hesiod does several apparently unprecedented things. At line 22, first of all, he names himself: "And it was

*This is the English original of a French translation of the same paper which appeared in the Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale, Vol. 82, 4 (Winter, 1977), pp. 433-56.

1. M. L. West (Hesiod, Theogony, Oxford, 1966, pp. 193-95) offers persuasive argument for accepting Tartaros as "a separate primeval element" with Chaos, Earth, and Eros. According to West, 118 and 119 are authentic, contrary to a long-standing tradition apparently rooted in Plato's Symposium 178b and Aristotle's Metaphysics 984a27; but 118 is "a formula complete in itself," such that the plural form of Τάρασα must be nominative. — See also R. A. Prior's note, supporting West from a "structuralist" point of view, "On Theogony 118 and 119," Classical Philology LXVII (1972), pp. 54-55. But Prior's point, that the heights of Olympos in 118 and (the 'lower region' of) Tartaros are paired as opposites, seems problematic; the τ of 119 pairs Tartaros, not Olympos. (Interpreting this pairing will be a major task in our discussion.) — Of course, judging 118-119 authentic does not entail accepting Tartaros as separate and primeval. As M. Stokes (in "Hesiodic and Milesian Cosmogonies," Phronesis 8 (1963), p. 1, n. 1) and, apparently, Prior too (in another essay, "Archaic Structuralism and Dynamics in Hesiod's Theogony," Apeiron 8 (1974), p. 3) think, the modifier μυκτός Χώσεως in 119 makes Tartaros subordinate or inferior to Earth. Though this is true (and we shall address ourselves to it below), it is overridden by the pairing force of τ in 119, which conjoins Earth and Tartaros as beings on a par. Thus West's position seems correct.

2. F. Solmsen (Hesiod and Aeschylus, Baltimore, 1949) appears to have noted this possibility, though ultimately rejecting it (see pp. 27, 52).


4. This is N. O. Brown's felicitous phrase, used to describe the "age" in which Hesiod lived, in the introduction to his translation of Hesiod, Theogony (New York, 1953), p. 15.

5. The poem is clearly tripartite, with the three parts - 1-35, 36-104, and 105-115 — corresponding to the three phases of the movement just described. — Prior's recent attempt (op. cit., pp. 1-2) to regard it as a series of three internally bipartite sections is not persuasive, however. He overlooks the clear division at 35/36; in 36 Hesiod repeats the opening phrase in 1, Μούσαις ἄρχουσα, so announcing a fresh beginning and (hence) a major division of parts. What is more, each of these first two parts bears evidence of further internal tripartition; in each we are led from a spectacle of the Muses' singing and dancing through a description of a journey (the Muses' in the first part, Zeus' in the second) to a description of a gift to man (the Muses' in the first part, Zeus' — and Apollo's — through the Muses in the second).
they [sc. the Heliconian Muses] who once taught Hesiod his splendid singing..."6 The significance of this abandonment of the traditional anonymity of the bard is suggested a few lines later. At 27-28 Hesiod has the Muses declare,

we know how to say many false things
that seem like true sayings,
but we know also how to speak the truth
when we wish to.

Evidently, Hesiod is critical of traditional lore; he finds much of it ("many false things") mere verismilitude. Hence, rather than merely passing it on in the relatively unself-conscious manner of the bard, he takes upon himself, personally, the task of presenting the truth. To be sure, he presents this presentation in the traditional manner, as a gift from the Muses. Even here, however, he appears to break from tradition. Whereas in all likelihood the Muses were traditionally an undifferentiated collective plurality,7 Hesiod singles them out and names them (77-79); what is more, he derives the names from a preceding characterization (63-71, also 51) of the diverse things they do. Thus, even while he remains within the Muse tradition, Hesiod is evidently thinking it through, rendering intelligible and, therefore, genuinely symbolic the opaque or "compact"8 terms which he has received from his culture.

This encourages us to pursue the questions we have raised of the cosmogonic statement at 116-133. To be sure, we need to stay as close as possible to Hesiod's own terms as possible. For that reason, we will put off an inquiry into a possible undeclared parentage and possible unspoken familial connections until we have established, as its basis, an understanding of the beings Hesiod does declare — especially obscure "Chaos" (part I) and "Tartaros" (part III) — and of the familial connections Hesiod does speak of (part II). These researches will show an astonishing mind at work in the cosmogonic passage. Not only is the genealogy carefully structured according to a complex inner necessity (part IV), but also, as we shall see, Hesiod is acutely aware of the limitations of genealogical discourse itself (part V).

I. The Location of Chaos: A Discussion with Cornford

Interpretation of the cosmogonic passage is problematic from the beginning. At 115 Hesiod concludes the preparatory proem by calling on the Muses to answer the fundamental question, "...which of the divine beings first came-into-being?" Then at 116 he has the Muses reply: "Chaos was the very first to come-into-being...." This is all they say of the origination of Chaos; they simply name it.

What Chaos is, is less debated than where it is. Etymologically, it derives from the root χα-, which means "gap" or "opening" in the sense, for example, of the receding gulf made in "yawning" (Greek χακαευ, χαλευ, which are cognates with χόκα).9 For Chaos to come-to-be, then, is for a basic "gapping" or differentiation to occur. But where is this gap? Or, what is differentiated from what?

The most influential discussion of this is still that of Francis Cornford in the posthumously published essay, "A Ritual Basis for Hesiod's Theogony" (1941).10 He offers very extensive comparative-mythological evidence that the primary event in archaic cosmogony is the separation of land and sky. Together with the sense of the root χα-, that evidently leads him to propose that the coming-into-being of Chaos is the original differentiation

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6 This and the citation of 27-28 which follows are R. Lattimore's in Hesiod (Ann Arbor, 1959).
7 West, op. cit., p. 32. West includes Hesiod's naming of the Muses in a list of several such "racionalizings." — Obviously similar in kind, incidentally, are Hesiod's various efforts at etymology. See, for example, his aside on the name of the Titans, at 207-210.
8 This term is borrowed from the very interesting analysis of the movement from mythic to philosophic mind presented in E. Voegelin's Order and History, vols. I (Baton Rouge, 1969 — see especially ch. 3, sect. 3) and II (Baton Rouge, 1957 — see especially ch. 5, sect. 1, where Hesiod is discussed).
9 F. Cornford (The Unwritten Philosophy, Cambridge, 1950, p. 98, n. 1) notes: "Most modern discussions of this term are vitiated by the introduction of the later idea of infinite empty space, and by modern associations with disorder. His translation, "gap", and West's (op. cit., p. 192), "chasms", both preserve the sense of an opening between two (thus separated) sides or, in the phrase of Kirk and Raven (The Pre-Socratic Philosophers, Cambridge, 1964, p. 28), a "bounded interval." In at least partial opposition to this view is Prier, op. cit., pp. 2-3. But it is a problem to understand how he moves from the "lexical" sort of definition of χαος he finds in West ("an empty space stuffed with darkness that can catch on fire") to his own interpretation of χος as the "other" (i.e., the polar contrast) to Earth.
of a pre-existing "one form" (to borrow Euripides' later phrase), into Heaven and Earth. Cornford is quite aware of the most obvious problem with this interpretation: at 126-128 Hesiod tells how Earth begets Heaven; if the birth of Chaos is the 'gapping' of Heaven and Earth, Heaven would already be born, together with Chaos and Earth, at 116-117, and 126-128 would be duplicated. But Cornford argues that such duplication is a basic feature of the Theogony and reflects the fact that Hesiod is both preserving archaic lore and rethinking and representing it in his own more rationalistic manner. Some of the particulars of Cornford's argument will be relevant later, so it is worth briefly recounting here.

To begin with, he notes a major break in thought-form at 134ff.: whereas 116-133 (the so-called "cosmogenic passage") present a relatively rationalist, almost Milesian-style cosmology, what follows is "pure myth," an account of gods who are "supernatural persons, with human forms and characters and well-known biographies." The latter, of course, is archaic lore which Hesiod restates, whereas the former is his own "rationalisation" of that lore, achieved primarily by the thoughtful "expurgation of mythical imagery." But "rationalisation" is repetition of the old in a new form. Hence it is not surprising to Cornford that each of the two versions in the cosmogenic passage has its antecedent and model in the anthropomorphic myth of the Theogony: the birth of Chaos is a reworking of the anthropomorphic tale of the castration of Heaven (156ff.), while Earth's begetting of Heaven is a reworking of Zeus' conquests of the monsters Echidna (295ff.) and Typhoeus (820ff.). What is more to the point, the fact that the lore inherited by Hesiod contains essentially two versions referring to the splitting of sky and land explains the presence of two accounts in the cosmogenic passage, for the latter, in reworking both tales, contains the vestiges of each.

Cornford's own insight into the reflective and relatively rationalist character of the cosmogenic passage as a whole makes this explanation unsatisfying, however. A fundamental aspect of "rationalisation" (or negatively, demythologization) is the effort to achieve new consistency and coherence. Hence -- though it is quite probable that Earth's begetting Heaven is an archaic motif incorporated into the cosmogenic passage -- it is not likely that it duplicates the birth of Chaos. A reflective Hesiod thoughtfully composing his account of cosmogenesis would surely have felt the awkwardness and even contradictoriness of giving a second, distinct description (at 126-128) of an event already fully and differently described only ten lines earlier (at 116-117). This has direct impact on the interpretation of Chaos. The clear implication is that the two accounts describe different events in the process of cosmogenesis; and since Heaven is mentioned explicitly and for the first time in the description of Earth's begetting of it (126-128), then the coming-into-being of Chaos must refer to a different 'gapping' or differentiation than that of Heaven from Earth. But, then, what other differentiation?

The observation of several other problems in Cornford's interpretation suggests an answer. (1) In support of his location of Chaos, Cornford cites 700 but ignores 814. The first passage describes how the fire of Zeus' bolts, hurled at the Titans, "crushed Chaos." Since the rest of the passage refers to land and sea and sky, and likens the

11 Euripides, fragment 484, cited by Cornford, op. cit., p. 98. Note that, in addition to his comparative-mythological evidence, Cornford (p. 98) cites later Greek uses of the term χάος. But as Kirk and Raven (op. cit., p. 27), note, "The evidence does not point to an extensive use of χάος as the space between sky and earth ..." And West (op. cit., p. 193) objects, "But this says nothing for Hesiod; new senses of the word Chaos are as old as Theraucydes ... Hesiod must be interpreted from his own text ..."

12 Cornford, op. cit., p. 100.

13 Ibid., p. 102. Cornford's view is supported, albeit in a refined form, by G. S. Kirk in Myth: its Meaning and Functions (Berkeley, 1970). Kirk takes, as evidence that Hesiod represents a transitional phase between mythic and rational mind, "... his reduction (for example) of the mythical golden and silver generations to a pseudo-historical schema, or his employment of personification and naked allegory in the idea that Dreams are the children of Sleep, or his quite assured use of genealogy as a logical tool" (pp. 246-47). At the same time, Kirk also stresses that "... such procedures do not show that he subjected myths to sophisticated treatment on every occasion and in every respect" (p. 247). Moreover, Kirk argues, the capacity to step back and make consciously symbolizing use of myth could hardly have been new with Hesiod. Further, his partial mastery over (as well as his partial subjugation to) myth must, as a stage in the development of mind, have existed "... in Greece for a very long time before [Hesiod]" (p. 241). The conception of Hesiod proposed by Cornford and developed in Kirk's Myth reminds one of C. Levi-Strauss' interesting notion of "bricolage" and the "bricoleur" (see The Savage Mind [London, 1966], pp. 16ff.); Hesiod is the inventive mind heir to and so possessed of a limited repertoire of expressive techniques; his work is not the result of applying a universal principle but, on the contrary, of his imaginative exploitation of his own sense of the limits of his resources. For some provocative comments on the conception of "bricolage" applied to Homer, see J. Peracdott's essay, "Odyssey 8.564-671: Verstimmlichkeit, Narrative Analysis, and Bricolage," in Texas Studies in Literature and Language XV-5 (1974), pp. 803-832.

14 This second connection is not so obscure as it first seems. Zeus' conquests of the monsters, Cornford argues (ibid., pp. 104-6), are fragments of an ancient creation story common to Hebrew, Babylonian, and Greek myth (at least); according to that story, an heroic young god (Zeus) slays a monster, dismembers it, and lifts up parts of it, as sky, out of and above the rest, which is land. The image of Earth's begetting Heaven preserves "just a trace" (p. 106) of this, according to Cornford; presumably (for Cornford does not give a focal explanation), the "trace" consists in the emergence of Heaven out of Earth.

15 Kirk and Raven evidently endorse this view, for they reason (op. cit., p. 28), "It seems not improbable that in the Hesiodic scheme the explicit description of the formation of Ouranos has been delayed through the confused use of two separate accounts (a confusion which can be paralleled from other details of the scheme), and that it is implied in line 116 at the very first stage of cosmogony."
sound of the fire (thunder?) to a collision of Heaven and Earth, it is not unreasonable to think of the “crushing” and the collision as essentially the same event, with Chaos being between Heaven and Earth. But at the same time, this reading is not necessary — especially since the thrust of the passage describes how nothing is safe from the reach of Zeus’ fire. Indeed, it would only heighten the passage to take the “crushing” and the collision as distinct and to imagine Chaos as beyond the whole space enfolded by Heaven and Earth.\textsuperscript{16} (2) But where might this space be? Cornford does not cite the other reference to Chaos later in the \textit{Theogony} at 814.\textsuperscript{17} There Tartaros is described as “beyond murky Chaos.” But Tartaros is on the other side of Earth from Heaven. The clear implication of this reference is that Chaos, as a gap or open space, is the gap between Earth and Tartaros. (3) Like many other commentators, Cornford does not give any consideration to the function of Tartaros in Hesiod’s cosmogony. Perhaps, like others, he rejects as inauthentic 119, the line in which Tartaros is introduced. But M. L. West has given very cogent philological argument for accepting 119,\textsuperscript{18} and that sets the interpreter the task of understanding why Tartaros is the third-mentioned of the four primordial powers. Whereas Cornford’s view has nothing to offer here, the alternative is extremely helpful. Tartaros is introduced in 119, immediately after Earth (117) and in very close conjunction with it (see the τε, 119), because the birth of Chaos is the gapping or differentiation of Earth from Tartaros (and vice versa). (4) Cornford’s view has one other major difficulty which only the alternative can resolve. “Another physical consequence of the opening of the gap,” he writes, “is that light is let in between the sundered parts.”\textsuperscript{19} But Hesiod’s account is much more complex. “Light” (Cornford assimilates Day and Aithêr, the bright upper sky) is born of “darkness” (assimilating Night and Erebos, the dark area of the underworld sometimes assimilated to Hades), and “darkness,” in turn, is born of Chaos. (123-125) If Chaos were the space between Earth and Heaven, would it not be more fitting for it to beget “light” than “darkness” — especially since an aspect of “light” is Aithêr, a spatially fixed area in the sky? Why would the space between Earth and Heaven be thought of as the parent, instead, of Erebos, an underworldly being? Yet, by contrast, there is no difficulty for the alternative view. If Chaos is the gap, under the Earth-centered world and separating it from Tartaros, it would be natural that it beget underworldly Erebos — as well as that it be called “murky” at 814.—

This shall therefore be our point of departure. Accepting Cornford’s insight into Hesiod’s cosmogony as a process of differentiation, we shall take the coming-into-being of Chaos to be the gapping or parting or differentiation of Earth from Tartaros. By means of this gapping (116), Earth (117) and Tartaros (119) emerge as distinct beings, that is, as Earth and as Tartaros, for the first time. All the same, this is only the very beginning of the strenuous process of interpretation we must now undertake. We have as yet said nothing about the fourth primordial power, Eros (120), and very little about the four as a whole. Nor do we as yet know much either about the interrelation of Earth and Tartaros or, for that matter, about what Tartaros is. All of these issues require consideration. First, however, to establish a specific context for them, we need examine the whole cosmogonic passage. Because we are seeking to discover the inexpressible relations amongst the first four powers (as well as their prehistory), this examination takes the form of a survey and classification of the types of explicit relations we find amongst the first several generations of their descendants.

\section*{II. Types of Relations in the Genealogy}

\subsection*{A. Contraries …}

The most conspicuous genealogical relation is contrariness. In the second begetting in the Chaos-line, Night and Erebos, children of Chaos, produce their specific and complementary contraries, Day and Aithêr (123-125). Likewise, Earth without a partner brings forth Heaven (126-128). That Heaven is Earth’s complement Hesiod makes clear by describing him as “like” or “equal” (ἀσυνομή) to her. Exhibited in these begettings is an insight which was to have a profound ‘career’ in all of later Greek philosophy, the recognition that every qualitative element or

\textsuperscript{16} Kirk and Raven (loc. cit.), referring to 700, write, “... why should the heat of Zeus’ fire penetrate to the underworld (the concussion of missiles does so at 681 ff., but that is natural and effective)? The Titans are not in the underworld, but on Mount Othrys (632); ...” But why is it not fully as “natural and effective” — in a description (a) of the unlimited reach of Zeus’ fire (b) in the course of a battle for the rule over the whole cosmos — for that fire to penetrate to the underworld? West, who takes \textit{φως} at line 700 to refer to “the region below the earth” (op. cit., p. 352), comments in reference to 682 that “it is a typical feature of a theomachy that its effects are felt even in the underworld” (p. 348). Vlastos (loc. cit.) and Hölscher (op. cit., p. 400) also make this argument. Note, further, that Tartaros would hardly be a secure prison for the Titans if Zeus’ fire did not reach the underworld.

\textsuperscript{17} Perhaps, like Kirk and Raven (op. cit., pp. 23, 28-31), he takes 814 to be inauthentic. But West (op. cit., pp. 356-359) gives persuasive argument to the contrary.

\textsuperscript{18} See n. 1 above. There is virtually no modern interpretation of Hesiod’s cosmogony which treats the presence of Tartaros amongst Hesiod’s primordial powers.

\textsuperscript{19} Cornford, op. cit., p. 99.
existential, in order both to be and to be apparent as itself, requires the existence of its contrary.20

B... as Paired Together

This need for the contrary suggests, of course, affinity or, more mythically, love. With separation comes togetherness - a dialectic of opposites which regulates opposition itself. Here we have a sudden glimpse into the need for Eros amongst the four primordial elements. As a force which unites, brings things together, it differs specifically from Chaos, which is a 'gapping' or parting, and is thus required by the latter as its contrary. Hesiod's selection of connecting particles in 116-120 reflects this inner necessity: ἡδ' at 120 recalls ἡ μὲν at 116 and pairs Eros together with Chaos in an adversative relation.21

Note, however, that just as separation implies togetherness, so togetherness implies separation. It is the union not of merger but of balanced contraposition. Hence, looking now to the relation between Earth and Heaven, we can see how fitting it is that the first (and only cosmogonic)22 issue of their erotic union is Ocean (133-134), the circular stream which, marking the farthest horizon, is a kind of 'seam' or 'joint' between Earth and sky (Heaven).23 They are joined yet held apart at once.

C. Self-Specification...

In addition to opposition, self-specification is also a principle of procreation. It is most patently exemplified by the partnerless begetting of Night and, later, of Night's own off-spring Eris (Strife).24

Night has, as one of her characteristic epithets, "destructive" (δολοθή, 224). This is natural, for at night, his vision limited and his limbs weary, a man is relatively powerless to defend himself or control his situation. Night thus carries a feeling of intense vulnerability to forces of destruction which are beyond man's control. Just such a feeling is, in effect, analyzed into a host of particular aspects in Night's off-spring: these are the powers of inexor-

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20 P. Philippson was the first to stress and explicate, in her ground-breaking essay "Genealogie als mythische Form" (now included in Hesiod, ed. E. Heitsch, Darmstadt, 1966, but first published in 1936), the role of polarity in Hesiod's thinking. Prier's essay (op. cit.) openly takes Philippson's work as a point of departure and develops it in interesting ways. We too are deeply indebted. But Philippson's interesting discussion of Hesiod's primordial powers and Prier's too (see n. 1 above) - do not include Tartaros. Hence our interpretations differ radically.

21 The four powers are knit together by an extremely intricate array of connecting particles in 116-122. Eliminating all epithetic material, there is the following basic syntax:

116 ἡμὲν ποιεῖται χάος γένετ' - ἀβραμ ἔρεως
117 Γα'...
119 Τάρασα τ'...
120 ἡδ' 'Ερεά...

To begin with the simplest point, τ' at 119 conjoins Γα' and Τάρασα. (It is not part of a rel/διακόμω pair, since that would govern Τάρασα and 'Ερεά and thereby leave Γα' unconnected. Cf. rel/διακόμω at Works and Days 757, 813.) This leaves us the task of interpreting the other conjunctions. There are four possible readings. (1) τὸν μὲν is merely emphatic (see J. D. Denniston, The Greek Particles, Oxford, 1934, p. 554); ἀβραμ ἔρεως is "weakly adversative, or purely progressive," marking the "successive stages of a narrative" (p. 55); and ἡδ' is simply conjunctive. (2) But that is a weak view, for ἀβραμ is frequently "strongly adversative" and "often answers μὲν" (p. 55); this would be natural here, for μὲν and ἀβραμ introduce the clearly contrasting ποιεῖται and ἔρεως, respectively. (3) In seeming tension with the second reading, however, is the fact that ἡδ', not usually found alone, is likely to recall ἡμὲν μὲν (the inserted ὃν having no substantive effect) and to set χάος and 'Ερεά into an adversative pairing. (On ὃν, see pp. 548-49, also 537, 554; on μὲν/διακόμω, see p. 287.) (4) It is really possible, however, for (2) and (3) to work together, and this seems most persuasive to us. To the Greek ear, ἀβραμ ἔρεως would, first, set the whole clause which follows into a contrast with the clause preceding; this contrast would effectively distinguish the genesis or birth of χάος from those (not yet announced) to come, making the latter in some (unspecified) sense contingent on it. But then, after τ' links Τάρασα with Γα', the ἡδ' of 120 - both by its dissociatedness from τ' and by its correspondence in form with μὲν - would link 'Ερεά with χάος. Hence Hesiod both makes the birth of χάος prior and special and establishes a double pairing amongst the four primordial powers.

22 The other children, the anthropomorphic Titans, do not belong in the account of cosmogenesis.

23 Kirk and Raven (op. cit., p. 26, n. 1) adopt this view of Ocean's relation to Earth and Heaven, and elsewhere (p. 10) they spell out one of its implications, that Heaven is dome- or bowl-shaped. West (op. cit., p. 198) doubts the second point, arguing that Heaven is shaped as a flat roof, parallel to Earth and supported by Atlas. But it does not seem impossible for such images to coexist in Hesiod. A comparable case, to be discussed later, is that of the location of Tartaros, which, though at one point (119) placed within the Earth, is for the most part placed under the Earth (e.g. 717 ff., 807 ff.). Such differing images seem to reflect different origins and/or different purposes on Hesiod's part. See p. 140 below.

24 These begettings are catalogued at 211-232, not in the cosmogonic passage proper. But they are akin to the begettings of that passage in two relevant respects: they continue the Chaos-line, and they are transparently thoughtful, presenting minimal personalized abstractions. Hence they are helpful in showing the structures of Hesiod's relational thinking. Note, incidentally, that Prier (op. cit.) discusses not only the begettings of Night but also those of Nereus (240-264); in both (which he takes as correlatively opposites within the structural unity of the genealogy as a whole) he seems to find a character spelled out by its offspring. And yet, strikingly, he does not seize on either of these, nor on any of the earlier begettings, as instances of the logical principle of generic self-specification. Without this recognition, however, the interplay of polarity (contrarity) and self-specification and, therefore, the sense in which Hesiod, at the beginning (as well as the end, see Prier, op. cit., pp. 8-9) of the genealogy, thinks beyond polarity (contrarity) cannot be exposed.
able doom and death (Μόρος, Κηρός, Ὀξιάρος, 211-212), as well as of sleep, closely associated with death by the Greeks, and the host of dreams which, irresistible, beset the spirit in sleep (212); also the powers of god-willed un-doing, whether in the form of consignment to infancy (Μυωμος, 214) or lamentable sentence (Οξιός, 214) or in the form of fateful lots (Μοίραι, 217) and vengeances (Κηρός, 217); and, finally, the powers of demise having their source in human nature and, so, inescapable, namely, rage-against-insult (Νέμων, 223), deceit, the passion of sexuality, old age, and Strife (224-225).

Having completed this baneful list, Hesiod immediately begins another, naming the children of Strife. Once again, the principle of procreation is self-specification. Strife’s epithets here are “hardhearted” or “stubborn” (καρπερόδουμον, 225) and “hateful” (σομαρθῆθ, 226), and the character of unremitting and harsh, painful struggle is manifested in diverse concrete forms by her children: hard labor, oblivion, famine, pains, fights, battles, murders, manslaughters, quarrels, lying words, disputes, lawlessness, blind impulse, and punishing oath.17 (226-233). As if it were not vivid enough already, Hesiod explicitly points to the generic unity which these painful beings share and spell out; they are, he says, “common in character with one another” (συμμηδεας ἀλόχληρος, 230). What is more, they are fitting grandchildren of Night, since they express in almost oppressive detail the unavoidable misery to which men, as finite creatures vulnerable to forces beyond any conscious control, must resign themselves. Hence, self-specification appears to unite three generations; that is, the self-specification of the first generation (Night) is completed only with the second generation’s (Strife’s) begetting of a third generation. This, we shall see, is relevant to the fourth type of relation displayed in the early stages of the Theogony.

D. . . . into Contraries

Just as separation and togetherness imply one another and are, indeed, separable aspects of the one relation of contrariety, so contrariety itself and self-specification imply one another and point to a higher, single relation. According to the dialetic logic of Plato and Aristotle, contrariety or “specific difference” is the normal principle for the articulation into parts of a generic whole or unity. Obviously, no such terms exist in Hesiod. Note, however, that several as yet unconsidered begettings suggest that Hesiod, even without such terms, nonetheless thought through the relations between several of his cosmic divinities according to the genus/species difference structure. The one clear case of this is Earth’s partnerless begetting of Hills and Sea (Ρόποξ) (129-32). Earth, initially an internally undifferentiated totality, specifies itself as — or differentiates itself into — the obviously complementary geographical features of mountain (“lofty,” dry, “forested,” the “happy haunts” of dancing nymphs) and sea (low, wet, “barren,” a “raging swell”).

E. Self-Specification and Contrariety (Chaos’ Line)

A more complicated example of the genus/species difference structure is the relation between the three generations of Chaos, Night and Erebos, and Day and Aithér. The begetting of Day and Aithér by Night and Erebos, we have already argued, expresses the intrinsic need which an existent has for its complement or contrary. Now, with the Earth-Hills-Sea relation in mind, we may rightly be moved to wonder whether the begetting by Night and Erebos expresses as well the need of Chaos, taken as a generic whole, to specify itself into contraries. If so, then the procreative work of Night and Erebos would in effect carry out and complete the task of self-differentiating self-specification which Chaos begins in begetting them. Can the relation of Chaos to its children and grand-children be interpreted in this way? Not too much more is heard in the Theogony of Erebos and Aithér. This may be because Hesiod assimilates them to their female counterparts; there is evidence for this especially in the case of Erebos, which seems to become epithetic to Night as “dark” (δρεπευμή).28 If we therefore take our cue from Night and Day, however, there is an interesting indication that we do have a three generational genus/species relation. At first it seems that Chaos, because it is on the far, ‘under’-side of Earth, is much more with Night than Day. Hence it is called “gloomy” (σομαρχεύος, 814). But at 748-751 Hesiod describes how Night and Day “draw near and greet one another as they pass the great threshold of bronze” through which they enter and depart their shared “house” (750, 751, 752). In this passage, of course, Hesiod is describing the alternation of Night and Day. What makes it striking in our context is that the “great threshold of bronze”

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15 For discussion concerning the meanings of μυωμος and οξιός, see C. Ramnoux, Le Nuit et les enfants de la Nuit dans la tradition grecque (Paris, 1959), pp. 67 ff. We omit mention here of the Hesperides, who are also daughters of Night. They are included by Hesiod perhaps because, as guardians in the far West of the golden fruit, they symbolize the unattainability of immortality for man. See H. J. Rose’s remarks on Heracles’ capture of the fruit in A Handbook of Greek Mythology (New York, 1959), p. 216; see also Ramnoux, loc. cit.

16 West (op. cit., p. 229) notes that 218-219, which mention Klotho, Lachesis, and Atropos, may be interpolated from 905-6. In any case, the listing of them only spells out the Moirai.

17 On why Oath (Οξιός) is child of Strife, see West’s note, ibid., p. 232.

18 See Ramnoux, op. cit., p. 64; also H. Frankel, Wege und Formen frühgriechischen Denkens (München, 1955), p. 319.
appears to belong to the "bronze gates" (733) which Poseidon is said to put up at the edge of Tartaros in order to contain the Titans; those gates, presumably, divide Tartaros from Chaos. Hence, Night and Day appear to be traveling through Chaos as they "draw near and greet one another." And this, in turn, suggests a reason why Hesiod, in his genealogy, would make Chaos specify itself according to the complementary aspects of Night and Day. In the moment of their "greeting" Chaos has the unique and remarkable character of being full of both.

F. Contrariety and Self-Specification (Earth’s Line)

Thus understood, the line from Chaos displays how begetting of the contrary completes the self-specification of generic unity. This should alert us to the converse possibility, namely, that the self-specification of generic unity completes begetting of the contrary. And in fact, there is good reason to see this as the impetus for Hesiod's account at 129-132 of Earth's self-differentiation into Hills and Sea. Though the logic of these begettings taken by themselves is clear, it is puzzling that Hesiod gives them such a prominent place in his cosmogony. Hills (129-130) are altogether insignificant both in the action and the genealogy of the rest of the Theogony. Sea is important, of course, but not necessarily more so than Ocean, whose birth (132-134) is not announced until after Sea's. What is more, the accounts of Earth's partnerless procreations of Sea and Hills intrudes on Hesiod's narration of Earth's relation to Heaven, coming between Earth's begetting of Heaven (126-128) and Earth's begetting, with Heaven, of Ocean (132-134). But the puzzle dissolves when we reflect that Earth, even while begetting Heaven as its specific 'other,' at first has the very same inner character as Heaven, namely, a lack of internal differentiation; thus, Earth's self-differentiation into Hills and Sea serves the purpose of completing Earth's difference from undifferentiated Heaven. This reading also explains why the birth of Ocean follows — and follows immediately — Earth's self-differentiation. Separation, we have seen, calls for togetherness. Once the differentiation of Earth from Heaven is complete, their integration is appropriate; hence they themselves give birth to Ocean which, on the horizon, holds them together as separate, or marks their differentiated unity.

III. Excursus: Earth and Tartaros in Hesiod's Cosmic Topography

The foregoing exploration of implicit rational structures of relation between the gods of Hesiod's first several generations was aimed to orient us in searching out the significance of the first, seemingly unparented births in the Theogony. Already we have begun to see the significance of Chaos and Eros. Now, taking the birth of Chaos as the separation of Earth and Tartaros, what can we say of their interrelation and, thereby, of their meanings?

It is immediately tempting to take Earth and Tartaros as contraries. They are closely conjoined at 119 by τε, and the syntax of 116-122 tends to set them up as a pair. Substantively, since each gains definite and specific existence — Earth as Earth, Tartaros as Tartaros — only once they are 'gapped' or distinguished, each appears to need the other as other. But these points are not sufficient to establish contrariety specifically. Yet, first of all, is not adverative. But what is more decisive, Earth has and expresses its need for its contrary in begetting Heaven.

This last objection, moreover, suggests a more promising possibility. With her "liking" or "equal" Heaven, their child the surrounding Ocean, and her internal differentiation into Hills and Sea, Earth in and of herself generates a complex, highly articulated cosmos. Might Tartaros be the complementary contrary to this articulated whole?

As such, Tartaros would have to be an inarticulate whole, a region lacking precisely that differentiation and structure which the Earth-centered region has. Strikingly, this is very much the way Hesiod refers to Tartaros at 728. There he writes, "...above Tartaros grow the roots of Earth and barren Sea." Note, first, that "roots" — an image for beginnings, origins — grow upward, that is, away from Tartaros. That the roots, secondly, grow "above Tartaros" suggests that Hesiod thinks of them not in Tartaros but, rather, in Chaos above Tartaros. But why, then, does he locate them by reference to Tartaros? At the least, Hesiod thereby calls attention to the lack of them in Tartaros; possibly, he also means to suggest that they grow out of Tartaros. On this image (which Lattimore evidently accepts, since he translates not "above" but "upward from [Tartaros]"), there would

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\[\text{19 See n. 21 above.}\]

\[\text{20 West (op. cit., pp. 356-59) gives good argument in support of the authenticity of these lines. Prior (op. cit., p. 4) in his very brief reference to Tartaros, cites 720-721 as evidence that Tartaros "... will eventually, in the structure of the universe, form the opposite to the realm of Zeus." Though arrived at from quite a different point of view, this is the point we are proposing, for the "realm of Zeus" is the earth-centered cosmos. But Prior does not bring his observation to bear on (his interpretation of) the cosmogonic passage at all.}\]

\[\text{21 Hesiod's word here, translated "Sea," is όδαλασσα; the term transcends, or at least is indifferent towards, the distinction between πόντος (Earth-encircled Sea, 132) and ὀκεανός (Earth-encircling Ocean, 133). Possibly Hesiod wants to refer to the watery element, as much of the cosmos, without making the Sea/Ocean distinction. For an analogous use of ὀκεανός and πόντος as mutually exclusive and of όδαλασσα as indifferent to the distinction, see 841 and 847.}\]
be, in effect, three strata: (a) highest, the region of Earth and Sea and the other elemental parts of the cosmos, the region characterized by their articulated co-existence; (b) next, the level of Chaos where not the elements but the roots of the elements are distinct but close together, perhaps intertwined; and (c) beneath Chaos a region in which there are no longer any roots, hence no distinctitude or articulation – this would be Tartaros, a region which, in its perfect lack of articulation, is the specific and complementary contrary to the Earth-centered and Earth-begotten world-order.

IV. The Pattern of Necessity in the Genealogy

The preceding reflections are oriented primarily towards Hesiod’s grasp of the ‘topography’ of the universe. But, taken together with our observations on contrariety in (II), they enable us to see a great deal (though not quite the whole story) concerning the pattern of necessity at work in the genealogy of the cosmogonic passage. The issues are sufficiently complicated, however, that we do best to divide our exposition into several stages: first, a brief reconstruction of the likely reflections which led Hesiod to make the separation of Earth from Tartaros prior to that of Heaven from Earth; second, a review of the character of Tartaros, based on the extremely terse description offered at 119; and, finally, a retracing of Hesiod’s genealogy in the cosmogonic passage, aimed at showing its unifying necessity.

A. The Primacy of Tartaros/Earth to Earth/Heaven

Although our alternative interpretation of the location of Chaos solves a number of problems generated by Cornford’s view, it also generates one apparent paradox in its own right. Why, when Hesiod had the separation of Earth and Heaven before his eyes, did he choose to give priority to the much more remote and, in fact, not visible separation of Tartaros and Earth? This question becomes all the more pressing when we acknowledge the great bulk of comparative-mythological evidence which Cornford marshals for his assertion that the Earth/Heaven split is primal.

In an oblique way, Cornford himself suggests the answer to this question. He asserts, we recall, that the relatively modern, nonanthropomorphic and quasi-cosmological character of the cosmogonic passage attests to the emergence of reason and thoughtfulness in Hesiod; in the cosmogonic passage we are witnessing the transition “from [archaic] religion to philosophy” (to steal Cornford’s famous title). Does not this make the relevance of Cornford’s own comparative-mythological evidence problematic? In positive terms, Cornford’s characterization of Hesiod’s emergent reason would be better supported by evidence that, having inherited the archaic view of the Earth-Heaven split as primal, Hesiod re-thought it and discovered it to presuppose another separation visible to the mind alone.

The reflections of (II) and (III) provide that evidence. Hesiod’s language at 126-128, as discussed in (II), makes it clear that he does not merely see the separateness of Earth and Heaven – he also understands them as complementary in that separateness. Earth begots, or differentiates from herself, Heaven as her “like” (iouv). Thus Hesiod grasps the Earth-centered cosmos as a totality. What is important, however, is that reflection cannot stop here. The same appreciation of contrariety which – starting from the givenness of Earth – makes the necessity of Heaven self-evident also leads Hesiod to see, given the existence of the differentiated Earth-centered cosmos, the necessity of an undifferentiated totality apart from it. This undifferentiated totality, we saw in (III), is Tartaros. Finally, since cosogenesis is understood as a process of differentiation, and this process necessarily moves from whole to parts, the order of Hesiod’s discovery of the differentiation of Earth et. al. from Tartaros will be reversed in his cosmogonic doctrine; that is, ‘before’ the Earth/Heaven separation there had to occur a separation or ‘gapping’ (Chaos) of Tartaros from Earth.

B. The Character of Tartaros

Of these three beings, only Tartaros has no off-spring in the genealogy of the cosmogonic passage.32 Since, according to (III), the whole Earth-centered cosmos has Tartaros as its contrary, the genealogical development of that cosmos can be grasped as a response to the specific character of Tartaros. Obviously, then, it is important

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31 As Preller-Robert (Griechische Mythologie I [Berlin, 1894], p. 39, n. 2) remarks, Tartaros is “wesentlich unschöpferisch.” Tartaros does beget later on in the Theogony, of course. With Earth, it produces the monster Typhoeus (520-22). But the many heads and diverse voices of the monster seem to express the impossibility as much as the possibility that Earth and Tartaros be integrated in love – as is befitting an integration of the non-integrated Tartaros with the core of the integrated cosmos. Typhoeus is utterly incoherent and disorderly. After its conquest by Zeus it is thrown into Tartaros, from where, appropriately, it sends forth the destructive, inconstant winds of the sea. But we exclude this begetting from our discussion since Hesiod’s account of it treats Earth and Tartaros anthropomorphically and so differs in kind from the relatively non-anthropomorphic, transparently cosmological cosmogonic passage.
to read closely the terse characterization, episthetic in form, which Hesiod gives of Tartaros at 119: “Tartara... the misty-aired in the innermost recess of wide-wayed Earth.”

The phrase confirms and augments our reflections on Hesiod's topography. Tartaros is a region and, as such, a 'whole'; Hesiod gives it a specific 'place' in the universe. (The more pointed significance of the locative phrase in 119 will be discussed below.) Further, the modifying “misty-aired” (νηφονέωρα) suggests a lack of internal differentiation. “Air” (ἀρπό) here refers to the fog or thick mist which, rolling down the Greek hillsides, characteristically envelops and obscures things; such a fog makes things impossible to 'pick out.' Hence, for example, we hear at the very beginning of the Theogony how the Muses make themselves invisible by “wrapping themselves in ἀρπό” (9). In such a wrapping they can be differentiated neither from one another nor from the fog itself; there is no visible form, no articulation at all. Note, however, — and here we augment our earlier reflections — that this lack of articulation means a lack not only of differentiation but of integration as well. As we saw earlier in (II), integration or unification presupposes differentiation; hence, where there is no differentiation, there can be only indistinctitude, not genuine unity. This, we suggest, is the reason for Hesiod's otherwise nonsensical use of the plural form, ῥάρπα, at 119. Though it is a 'whole' region, and in that sense 'one,' Tartaros is also altogether non-integrated, and in that sense no more 'one' than 'many'; it is simply indeterminate. Both the plural form and the comparison with the vividly structureless, equivocal ἀρπ point up this character.  

C. Necessity in the Genealogy

Given Hesiod's care insight into the complementary contrariety of the Earth-centered cosmos and Tartaros, the genealogical development in the cosmogonic passage becomes transparently rational. According to the logic of contrariety, a being, in order to be itself, requires its contrary. Tartaros, an undifferentiated and un-integrated whole, requires the coming-into-being of a differentiated and integrated totality. With Chaos (116) and Earth (117), the principle of differentiation — spatially represented as a ‘gap’ arising, of necessity, ‘outside’ Tartaros — and the core of the differentiated world come-into-being; immediately after the naming of the pluralized ῥάρπα, Eros (120-122), the principle of integration, arises. Then there follow a series of births — that is, differentiations and integrations — which make of the Earth-centered cosmos a perfect contrary, complete in every respect, to Tartaros. Without repeating the analyses of (II), let us briefly retrace these.

First, Chaos differentiates itself into the spatial (Flebos) and temporal (Night) aspects of darkness (124); but these latter two are immediately moved by Eros (as φαλόντης, 125) to conjugate and produce their respective complementaries, Aithér and Day (124). The second act completes the self-differentiation of Chaos into light and darkness, an act which is later given the fundamental significance of the friendliness (togetherness in separation) of opposites, as symbolized by the greeting that Night and Day exchange in Chaos (see 748 ff.). Presumably simultaneous with Chaos' three-generational development is Earth's; but whereas a begetting of the contrary completes Chaos' self-differentiation, in Earth's case a self-differentiation completes her begeting of the contrary. First Earth distinguishes Heaven from herself (126-128); then she distinguishes Hills and Sea within herself (129-132). This second act completes her differentiation of herself from Heaven. Note how, in precise analogy with darkness and light, Hills and Sea require no further integration with one another; as Chaos is for Night and Day in their moment of greeting-in-passing, so Earth is the medium in which Hills and Sea exist together as distinct. But matters are otherwise for Earth and Heaven. Now that Earth is internally differentiated, undifferentiated Heaven stands as her fully different contrarily; yet they exist in no comprehending or embracing medium, no pre-existent generic unity. Hence Eros moves Earth to lie (ἐβρισθεία, 133) with Heaven to produce the 'seam' or 'joint', Ocean, which holds them together on the horizon (132-134).

With this last birth, the cosmogonic genealogy is complete. There are no loose ends. Every elemental being born of Chaos and Earth stands together with its contrary within the complex unity of the Earth-centered cosmos. And the four primordial powers themselves appear to be fulfilled in their essential meanings by their functions or places in this complex unity; but we need to focus one last time on these four.

V. The Limits of Genealogy

The preceding discussion of inner necessity in the genealogy provides a striking foundation and point of departure for a final reflection on the meaning of 116-122. To recall synoptically the problems in that passage which we noted at the very beginning of this essay: Hesiod's ἄνερ at 116, given the genealogical cast of the

The plural is also used at 841, in the phrase ῥάρπα γαιαν. Everywhere else (682, 721, 725, 736 = 807), 822, 868) Hesiod uses the singular. The use of the plural at 841 is interesting, for there, as in 117-119, Tartaros and Earth are closely joined; in both cases Tartaros is pluralized by contrast with Earth and is set in subordination to Earth. For discussion of the subordination, see V, B below.
Theogony, suggests a prior parental being and, as well, familial bonds amongst the four powers — yet Hesiod neither identifies a parent nor associates the four as kin. The bearing of the preceding discussion on these problems is two-fold. First, the discussion shows Hesiod as a masterful genealogist, capable of articulating complex interrelations in genealogical terms; it therefore becomes altogether improbable that the problems of 116-122 reflect a simple breakdown of Hesiod’s genealogical insight. Second, and more particularly, the discussion points to a solution to the problems so obvious that it could not have escaped Hesiod’s attention — and yet, strikingly, he does not give it. To clarify these issues we will first discuss that solution and then attempt an interpretation and evaluation of 116-122 in light of it.

A. The Conspicuously Undeclared Parent

In (IV), bringing together various insights of (I), (II), and (III), we interpreted the development of the Earth-centered cosmos as a response to Tartaros’ need for its contrary; that is, in transparent, nonmythic terms, the differentiated cosmos is constituted as the necessary contrary to the undifferentiated. Now, we have seen that the proper genealogical motif for depicting a being’s need for its contrary is begetting; and we have argued that Hesiod’s characterization of Tartaros at 119 as “misty-aired” (ἱπποδέερα) stresses its meaning as the internally undifferentiated. The clear genealogical implication of this is that Tartaros is the parent of the Earth-centered cosmos.

That Hesiod realized this implication is indirectly supported, it should be noted, by the topographical image suggested by 727-728 (as discussed in [III]). “Roots” symbolize the beginnings or points of origin of things. If Lattimore is right to envisage the roots growing “upward from” Tartaros, then Tartaros would have the character of source for the rooted elements of the Earth-centered cosmos. And the character of source in topography corresponds to or is the analogue of the character of parent in genealogy. 34

B. The Subordination of Tartaros

And yet, strikingly, Hesiod does not name Tartaros as parent. On the contrary, 116-122 appears, at least, to represent an opposite approach. In the temporal order of births, Tartaros, twin-born with Earth, comes second. And in the order of mention, Tartaros comes third, being named after Chaos and Earth. Finally, the locative phrase in the epithet with which Hesiod first introduces Tartaros in effect subordinates it to Chaos and Earth. Hesiod locates Tartaros “in the innermost recess of wide-wayed earth” (μαθιξα χώρας εύπροδε ἐπτην, 119). The use of this phrase is surprising, for its characterization of the “innermost recess” — which must refer to the primordial gap or Chaos — as a recess “of” Earth35 and its placement of Tartaros “in” this recess express a point of view much more archaic and earthbound than Hesiod’s. Only three lines earlier, in fact, he made Chaos in some sense prior to Earth; and later, of course, he presents the ‘three-tier’ topographic vision, in which Earth is only a basic member of one tier. Why, then, does Hesiod use this phrase? And more generally, why does he subordinate Tartaros to Chaos and Earth?

In fact, the subordination of Tartaros is inconsistent with parentage by Tartaros only if the relationships are thought through without distinguishing genealogical symbol from what it is symbol: for. Obviously, it makes no sense for Tartaros to be born after, and in subordination to, the children it begets. If, however, we suppose that Hesiod distinguished genealogical symbol from the logical meaning it symbolized, and thought through the relationships in terms of the latter, then the inconsistency dissolves; moreover, Hesiod’s evocation of the earthbound point of view in 119 takes on new meaning. Tartaros, precisely as the undifferentiated, immediately implies, and so requires the existence of, its own differentiation from the differentiated. In the aspect of implying and requiring these, we find the logical meaning of parentage; the normal genealogical expression for such need would be for Tartaros to beget what it requires. But because the requirement is immediate, this expression is not possible; parent and child cannot be born at the same time. Hence, to express this insight, Hesiod must drop all talk of parent and child and — since these are the only elocutionary means remaining — make very precise use of the orders of time and mention, of syntax and endings, and of epistemic formula. We are now in a position to gather our earlier remarks on these various features of 116-122 into one coherent interpretation of the

34 There is also the image of πηγάδα (“well-springs”) in 736-739 (= 807-810), where 727-728 is expanded. Well-springs bubble up out of the ground which, thus, is the ultimate source. 736-739 (= 807-810), it might be noted, contains the remarkable paradox that Tartaros is both the source for the diverse elements of the cosmos and itself one of those sourced elements. Kirk and Raven (op. cit., pp. 30-1) refer to this as one of various “inconsistencies and impossibilities, which indicate that [the passage is one of several] superficial expansions by composers who were either careless or stupid.” But it is also possible that the paradox is intentional and that Hesiod means to express the sense in which Tartaros, by sourcing others, gives itself specific existence, as other than them, for the first time and in this sense sources itself as well as the others. Vlastos (op. cit., p. 74) argues that 736ff. is inconsistent with 116-132. Note, however, that the paradox of 736ff. also appears in 116-132. And there are interesting parallels in the order of terms: Earth and Tartaros are introduced together, in that order, in 736, as at 116-117, and are followed by Sea and Heaven at 737, as in 123-123. Vlastos generally ignores Tartaros in his brief discussion of the two passages.

35 It is a puzzle why Hesiod uses χώρας here, rather than Γαῖα. Cf. Solmsen, op. cit., p. 59. Note, though, that it does tend to dissociate the topographical image of 119 from other treatments of Γαῖα and its topographical relations to Chaos and Tartaros; that may be Hesiod’s intent.
passage.

(1) Viewing the cosmos in terms of its differentiated structure and viewing cosmogenesis, in turn, as a process of differentiation, Hesiod reflects back to a primal condition of undifferentiatedness. Thus he thinks back to Tartaros. (2) But that condition, precisely as undifferentiatedness, presupposes, as together with it, the complementary condition of differentiatedness; what is more, the former can be understood only by reference to the latter. Thus he makes Earth twin-born with Tartaros and of the two, names Earth first. (3) The coexistence of Earth and Tartaros, however, presupposes their differentiation; further, this differentiation, as the relation which lets each of them be as itself in contrast to the other, grounds their existence and so precedes both. Thus Hesiod, having tightly conjoined Earth and Tartaros by τὸ (119), names Chaos as the "very first", giving it precedence in time as well as mention over Earth and Tartaros. (4) One fundamental insight underlies and unites this complex priority structure: as the undifferentiated, Tartaros is only through the being of its differentiation from the differentiated; that is, Tartaros' very existence, as the first or fundamental being, consists in its self-negation and subordination to the others which it requires. Thus Hesiod, stressing its undifferentiated character (ηρέποεντα), first introduces Tartaros in terms of Chaos and Earth, locating it at the bottom of an ultimate gulf or "recess inside" the Earth. (5) Finally, the lack of differentiation is also the lack of integration; or, positively, differentiation requires integration as its contrary and vice versa. Thus Hesiod follows the pluralized Τάρπατα of 119 with the introduction of Eros at 120; by ἤδη, moreover, he recalls ἦ... ὢν in 116 and so pairs Eros together with its contrary Chaos.

C. Notes on the Development of Thought

This reconstruction of 116-122 has two important implications. First, it transfigures the problems we noted at the beginning of this essay. What initially appeared as a weakness in Hesiod's execution of genealogy now appears as a limitation of genealogical discourse itself. Hesiod has caught sight of the necessity of differentiated beings, given only — paradoxical as it sounds — the existence of the lack of it. In this sense he is reaching towards an ontological frame of reference, and the presuppositions of genealogical discourse — above all, the separation and priority in time of the parent-child relation — are obstacles in his way. The γενέτορι of 116, the sole genealogical utterance in 116-122, is therefore too much, not too little.

Note, however, that these remarks pertain only to 116-122 and not to the remainder of the cosmogonic passage. The second important implication of our reconstruction is thus to suggest a significant change in the form or mode of thought within the cosmogonic passage. In this point we are actually only radicalizing an insight of Cornford's. He observed a significant shift in thought-form in moving from the cosmogonic passage into the anthropomorphic genealogy and personalistic history which dominates the Theogony after 133. This shift presumably reflects the fact that after 133 Hesiod is dealing with older gods or, at least, older conceptions of them than in the cosmogonic passage, whereas in the latter, conversely, Hesiod relies more on his own reason and reflection than on archaic imagery. Hence the Theogony bears witness, in effect, to the ongoing history of thought. We now suggest that, analogous to the break from anthropomorphic genealogy in 116-133 as a whole, there is a break from genealogy as such at 116-122. The first foreshadows the development of cosmology from myth (as Cornford suggests). In particular, Hesiod's family of Earth, Heaven, and Ocean suggest the Milesians' emerging conception of a symmetrical world-system, while Tartaros resembles an Anaximandran διήνεμος. The second break, on the other hand, foreshadows the more radical development of a logic of Being from cosmology. In a way which warrants treatment in its own right, Hesiod's insight into the paradoxical immediate self-subordination of Τάρπατα ηρέποεντα anticipates Parmenides' all-important pondering on nonbeing. More generally, his striving

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34 There is an extremely interesting affinity between the self-subordination of Tartaros, the fates of jealous Heaven and Kronos in the anthropomorphic myth of the Theogony, and the 'ethical' principle spoken in the Works and Days: the half is greater than the whole. Heaven and Kronos are 'taught' i.e. principle the hard way: they seek all power for themselves, at the expense of their off-spring, and this provokes the latter to overthrow them; only Zeus, who distributes power, thereby resides over a stable cosmic order. By these mythic narrations Hesiod can portray his principle paradigmatically; these portrayals, however, express the necessity of the principle only indirectly (by the fact that the same comportment provokes the same demise twice in a row), since they present willful 'persons' and contingent happenings. Is it possible that the self-subordination of Tartaros — as the self-subordination of an undifferentiated whole to a differentiated order — is intended as an expression of the principle in its necessity? Note that the deposed Kronos is thrown into Tartaros. The topic deserves separate and full discussion.


36 Note how Parmenides has the gates of the paths of Night and Day reveal a "gaping chasm" (κατα τον ἅλο, 1.18), in the prose of his poem. At 740 in the Theogony Hesiod calls Tartaros a "great chasm" (Ἑλώ ἑράντων); and the routes of Night and Day, we saw earlier, pass through bronze gates at the border of Tartaros. Depending, of course, on how we interpret the symbol of the gates in Parmenides, his reappropriation of Hesiod's imagery may point to a substantive kinship between the two. For a full discussion of this, see my "Parmenides and the Disclosure of Being," Apeiron 13, No. 1 (1979), pp. 12-25.
for an expression of logical meaning not fundamentally genealogical or anthropomorphic suggests that some of the harsh criticism he receives in the philosophical sixth century is actually Hesiodic in origin.

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39 See, especially, Heraclitus, frag. 57; also frag. 40 and Xenophanes, frags. 11 and 12.