

In the end, *Flying Tiger* makes an important scholarly contribution to our understanding of political institutionalization as a framework for studying foreign policy. This reviewer is struck by the depth and breadth of the research, as well as the extent to which the analysis reinforces our understanding of the enduring dilemma about how and why states define their interests and policies in formulating foreign policy. What makes this book interesting from a scholarly perspective is its reaffirmation of the centrality of domestic processes to foreign policy, the fact that their precise influence is unresolved, and the continuation of the debate on this matter by scholars and policymakers. Ultimately, political institutionalization is an important instrument for scholars who debate why states make the foreign policy choices that they do.

Rebel Rulers: Insurgent Governance and Civilian Life During War. By Zachariah Cherian Mampilly. Ithaca, NY:

Cornell University Press, 2011. 320p. \$45.00.
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— Kristin M. Bakke, *University College London*

In his book, Zachariah Mampilly tackles an important yet understudied question: Why do some rebel groups set up administrative structures that provide public goods—such as security, education, and health care—while others do not?

Drawing on extensive fieldwork in rebel-controlled areas in Sri Lanka, Sudan, and the Democratic Republic of Congo, the author shows that rebel groups sometimes provide effective governance, rather than dismissing insurgent-held territories as lawless and ungoverned. The Tamil Tigers, for example, in a rather complex arrangement with the Sri Lankan government, designed a system of civilian administration that provided public goods, such as education and health care. In Southern Sudan, the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) co-opted the efforts of international humanitarian organizations and developed an administrative system that was effective in certain areas but not in others. In the Democratic Republic of Congo, the main insurgent organization, the Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie (RDC)-Goma, tried but largely failed to develop a functional civilian administration.

Even though insurgent-held territories can be more than the fiefdoms of unruly warlords, they are not necessarily states in the making. Mampilly emphasizes that rebel rulers are engaged in a related yet different endeavor than the state-building process that existing states went through, as rebel rulers operate in an international system already dominated by recognized states. Thus, he argues, rather than relying on the theoretical lenses of warlordism or state building, scholars ought to focus on rebel governance “on its own merits, for its actual forms and functions during a conflict” (p. 49).

To that end, *Rebel Rulers* provides a theoretical framework aimed at explaining variation in insurgents' engagement with citizens in the territories they control, yielding a series of hypotheses. Mampilly maintains that variation in rebel governance can be explained neither by insurgents' ideological views, as emphasized by revolutionaries such as Mao Zedong and Che Guevara, nor by their resource base, as argued by, for example, Jeremy Weinstein in *Inside Rebellion: The Politics of Insurgent Violence* (2007). Instead, rebel groups' ability to provide effective governance is constrained by pressures from and interactions with a variety of actors.

From *below*, insurgents face pressures from the citizens in whose name they are fighting. Citizens make explicit demands and have expectations based on the state–society relations that existed prior to the war. Thus, an insurgent group is less likely to develop effective governance if the state previously did not penetrate society. In contrast, where the state did penetrate society, insurgents are likely to co-opt existing institutions. Insurgent groups also face pressures from *within*, both from individuals and factions within the group. Groups fighting a secessionist war in the name of a specific population may have to work harder to convince their supporters that they can govern than groups fighting over control of the central government. Lulls of relative peace will allow insurgents to devote time and resources to governance efforts, and groups able to create a unified political command are more likely to develop effective governance than groups plagued by internal rivalries. Insurgent groups are also constrained from *above*, from the multitude of transnational actors that operate in conflict zones. Focusing on humanitarian organizations, Mampilly argues that insurgents are more likely to provide effective governance if they can co-opt the efforts of such organizations, although under certain conditions, competition from nongovernmental organizations might push insurgents towards public goods provision. The book points to conditional relationships among these different constraints—prewar state penetration might condition whether secessionist groups are able to provide effective governance—although such conditional relationships are not central to the analysis and could be further explored.

The theoretical framework is put to the test in three in-depth case study chapters of the Tamil Tigers, the SPLM/A, and the RCD-Goma, which to varying degrees provided effective governance. Each case highlights the dynamics of certain hypotheses more than others, although the chapters do not directly refer to hypotheses developed earlier. Rather, the case studies are followed by a chapter that revisits the hypotheses, comparatively examining the three cases and also briefly considering additional cases.

This framework and the empirical analysis are compelling, and the book raises a number of new research questions. One that could be further explored concerns the wartime relationship between the state and the insurgents.

Mampilly dubs rebel rulers “counterstate sovereigns,” noting: “They are counterstate actors in that their competitive relationship with the state is the premium impulse that motivates every aspect of their civilian governance project. They are also sovereign in that they do not only adopt many of the empirical functions of the state but also seek to gain a degree of legitimacy by mimicking the trappings of the nation-state itself” (p. 61). While the state’s role, as such, is key to the context in which rebel groups try to carve out systems of governance, the specific hypotheses pay little attention to the state’s wartime efforts. The hypotheses directly address how prewar state–society relations and the intensity of fighting with the state affect rebel groups’ ability to provide effective governance. Yet the case studies reveal that the state’s actions—in particular its public goods provision—during the war also matter. Central to the analysis of the Tamil Tigers, for example, are the ways in which their governance system evolved in interaction with the ongoing efforts of the Sri Lankan government to rule the very same territory. While Mampilly stresses that insurgent governance is always conditional on the war-zone-specific context, it is worth further exploring whether one can think systematically about how wartime interactions between the state and insurgents shape rebel governance.

This is an important book. Theoretically, it speaks directly to key debates in comparative politics, international relations, sociology, and political geography—on sovereignty, state building, state–society relations, the organization of armed groups, and the role of transnational actors. The concluding chapter charts out implications for related research agendas on rebel recruitment, insurgent violence, political order and legitimacy, and postconflict societies. Empirically, the book is an exciting read, as Mampilly takes the reader with him to places that we often do not know much about. In addition to relying on the existing literature on each case, the empirical narrative draws on Mampilly’s fieldwork observations and many interviews with actors in insurgent-held territories. The author’s own photos of examples of governance efforts, such as a school in a village controlled by the Tamil Tigers (LTTE), are a nice touch.

In policy terms, the author challenges the ways in which the international community deals with insurgent organizations—typically treating them as illegal or irrational actors that are not to be granted recognition. In his discussion of the SPLM/A’s governance in southern Sudan, he contends that despite shortcomings, the organization deserves credit for its partial success in creating a system of governance in a region where government capacity prior to the war was weak. Such an ability of insurgent organizations to govern should matter, Mampilly argues, and he calls for granting limited juridical recognition to organizations that do develop effective civilian governance. He acknowledges that many insurgent organizations would not deserve recognition based on such a

criteria, but it would provide incentives for rebel groups to provide public goods to citizens in territories they control. Such a call for rethinking questions of recognition and sovereignty is controversial, but *Rebel Rulers* makes a case for doing just that.

The Shadow of the Past: Reputation and Military Alliances Before the First World War. By Gregory D. Miller. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2011. 248p. \$45.00. doi:10.1017/S1537592712002654

— Christopher J. Fettweis, *Tulane University*

Does international interaction mirror the corporate world? How much can scholars of international relations learn from the insights of those who study the business world? Among the latter, for instance, it has become conventional wisdom that reputation matters a great deal. Firms that are perceived to be reliable have an easier time attracting new customers, raising capital, and entering into beneficial arrangements. Scholars of international politics are generally skeptical about the importance of reputation for states.

While clearly there are important differences between business and interstate relationships, it is curious that scholars in different fields have arrived at such disparate conclusions regarding a crucial shared concept. In his book, Gregory Miller aims to explain that disconnect, and challenge IR’s conventional wisdom about the relative unimportance of state credibility and reputation.

The IR scholarship on reputation and credibility in international politics has evolved through a couple of clear stages. In the first, early-deterrence theorists like Thomas Schelling argued that actions are *interdependent*, that potential adversaries and allies routinely learn fundamental lessons about the basic disposition of states based upon their behavior in other arenas. In practice, this meant that remaining engaged in otherwise peripheral, pointless ventures (Vietnam, Korea, etc.) made sense as attempts to send messages about US resolve. Four decades of empirical and theoretical work have brought that wisdom into doubt; today, the dominant view in the academy (if not yet among practitioners) is that actions tend to be *independent*, that other states rarely learn the lessons we hope to teach. The current consensus—one that has been supported in recent years by the work of Jonathan Mercer, Ted Hopf, Daryl Press, and many others—is that, despite what practitioners may believe, reputations do not decisively affect the actions of others. Furthermore, states can do little to control their reputations for resolve; target states form their own views, ones that are largely unaffected by efforts to control them.

Miller astutely notes that almost all of the existing work on reputation and credibility has focused on resolve, or specifically on the relationship of these concepts to the outbreak of war. The literature to this point has been focused at least in part on the answer to this question: Are