35

India's sojourn to Africa

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Introduction

Even though analyses of India's contemporary engagement with Africa are only now starting to generate pace, a misleading narrative of this relationship has already taken hold. India's involvement with Africa is assumed to be driven by its hegemonic competition with the People's Republic of China within the broader Indian Ocean world. In particular, analysts have emphasized China and India's jockeying for economic markets, natural resources and security.

There is much that is worthy in such an approach. By distilling India's motivation to engage in Africa to a singular factor—competition with China—a digestible narrative comes to the fore. According to this account, the end of the Cold War forced India to engage in a set of economic reforms that emphasized opening the country's domestic market while simultaneously restructuring the economy towards a more export-oriented approach. This unshackling of the Indian economy led to a prolonged economic boom that has set the country in search of markets and resources to fuel its continued growth.[1] Africa, long neglected as a market, and until recently inefficient in exploiting its tremendous natural resources, provided the perfect complement to India's particular needs. However, focused on reorienting its relationship to the USA and other Western markets, India is losing out to China in accessing (exploiting?) Africa's deep potential. The Chinese, meanwhile, have devoted vast state resources to wooing African governments and have taken a perhaps insurmountable lead over India in controlling the continent's resources. India is now engaged in a game of catch up, though it lacks the resources that China has to woo African leaders. Instead, the Indian government offers pithy comments regarding historical ties or a common culture to make up for its lack of resources and inattention.

However, such a realist, China-centric interpretation is not the most useful way to understand India's African journey. Since their 1962 defeat by Chinese forces, Indian leaders have obsessed over China's rise, rendering competition between the two neither a novel nor an especially noteworthy factor in their relationships with other countries.[2] In addition, the Asian economic boom has forged deeper ties between the two rivals than ever before with China recently surpassing the USA to become India's largest trading partner.

From a theoretical perspective, many of the conventional analyses of India's relationship with Africa forgo an opportunity to develop novel theoretical approaches for understanding what is

at core a distinctively new phenomenon—the emergence of a robust South-South economic relationship capable of driving new political alignments and realignments at the international level. In particular, the relationship between the two provides an opportunity to assess and even build new models of South-South international interactions that don't dismiss the phenomenon as mere political posturing.

This chapter first provides an overview of India and Africa's contemporary relationship based on the extant literature. It then offers an assessment of this literature, arguing that it suffers from several theoretical and empirical flaws. Finally, it attempts to sketch an alternative theoretical paradigm that better fits the case, drawing on the work of scholars dedicated to developing a theory of non-Western international relations (IR).

Survey of Indian-African relations

South Asia and Africa have been linked for millennia by migration, trade and cultural exchange. Egypt and Ethiopia (Aksum) engaged in economic relations with historical India[3] as far back as the first century AD, and likely earlier.[4] Migrants from Africa to India and vice versa moved via land or sea in pursuit of war, fortune or faith from ancient times and into the present day, interacting across the vast canopy of the Indian Ocean, the once and future centre of global history. The dawn of European colonial rule circumvented the relationship between the two, regulating interactions and forcibly introducing class and racial hierarchies into what had been a free-wheeling relationship before. However, colonialism also triggered the largest labour migrations across the Indian Ocean, moving vast populations from South Asia to East and South Africa to work as soldiers, labourers, traders and middle-men with defined roles within colonial society.

During the early half of the 20th century, South Asians and Africans reconnected working closely to liberate their countries through organizations such as the League Against Imperialism.[5] In the immediate post-colonial period, newly independent African and South Asian nations (especially Egypt, India and Ceylon (now Sri Lanka)) took the lead in advancing the cause of Third World unity through organizations like the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and the Group of 77 within the United Nations (UN). Under the rule of India's first prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, the country struck a highly moralistic tone in its foreign policy which some have claimed was better suited to a liberation movement than an independent state.[6]

Yet despite these historical ties, India and African countries have never enjoyed as close political and economic relations as African countries have with Europe, the USA and, more recently, China. This was especially true in the immediate post-Cold War period when unmoored from the bipolar division of the world that positioned non-alignment as an appeal-ing, if less than meaningful position, both India and African countries turned inward to sort out crises, both political and economic. No longer led by the staunch internationalists of the post-Independence period, Indian leaders came across as ill-suited to navigate the shifting contours of the emerging globalized international order.[7]

In the new millennium, the ongoing repositioning of Asia at the centre of the global econ-omy has shaken Indian and African leaders out of their collective stupor with both sides hustling to exploit the emergent opportunities. For Africa's elite, Asia's rise offers a reset button in their engagement with international powers, a tabula rasa unencumbered by the colonial and neo-colonial legacies that continue to linger over their partnerships with the West. For India, pro-longed economic growth has seen the country re-emerge as a global player, newly confident in its economic abilities, though lacking a moral underpinning to its increasingly opportunistic foreign policy agenda. It is no surprise that Indian leaders have worked to build mutually ben-eficial relationships with African governments in pursuit of political and economic objectives.

Zachariah Mampilly

Indian foreign policy making, according to the scholar C. Raja Mohan, relies on a division of the planet into three concentric circles.[8] The first encompasses the South Asian region areas wherein India seeks to assert veto power over the actions of states such as Nepal, Bhutan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Maldives and Pakistan to varying degrees of success. Africa, particularly the Indian Ocean littoral states, sits within the second circle, an arena in which India demands a substantive and potentially dominant role, but is unable to assert this due to competition from the USA and China.

The third circle encompasses the planet. India's desire to claim its place as a great power within a new multipolar world order drives its increasingly assertive push across the continent, including in areas with which it historically has had minimal ties, such as the West African sub-region. The Indian government pins its hopes for enhanced international standing on African states supporting its stated desire to be granted a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. To this end, the government has supported a number of initiatives geared towards wooing the support of African leaders, most announced at various high-level summit meetings that the government intends to hold every three years.[9]

In April 2008, the first India-Africa Summit was held in New Delhi. Following the lead of China, which held a similar summit attended by over 40 African heads of state in 2006, India's version was only able to attract 14 African leaders as well as the leaders of all eight major African regional groupings. None the less, it was successful in producing the 'Delhi Declaration', which outlined the 'Africa–India Framework for Cooperation' with several tangible outputs including: an increase in the level of credit from US$2 billion to over $5 billion by 2013; $500 billion for capacity building and human resource development; the creation of a duty-free tariff preference scheme for the 34 least-developed African economies covering a wide variety of products; and financial support for the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), as well as other regional integration efforts.[10]

In May 2011, a follow-up summit was held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, attended by the Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and representatives from 15 African states. Singh arrived in Ethiopia after visiting four other African countries, his fourth African trip since coming to power in 2006. In addition to reaffirming commitment to the 2008 framework for co-operation and initiating new avenues for engagement, the Addis Ababa Declaration also voiced support for an expanded Security Council which would include India and an unnamed African country as permanent members.[11] In addition, the conference declaration waded into the contemporary political morass, indirectly rebuking the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) powers for their campaign in Libya by calling for an end to bombing in favour of a peaceful settlement negotiated by the African Union (Libya was an attendee at the conference).[12] A third India-Africa summit is scheduled for New Delhi in 2014.

Indian aid to Africa

In 2003, the government of India decided to transform its aid profile, from a net aid receiver to an aid donor. It stopped accepting aid from all but a few donors and repaid $1.6 billion to 14 bilateral donors. Simultaneously, the country announced the creation of the India Development Initiative, immediately cancelling the debts owed it by seven of the most heavily indebted nations, including five on the continent.[13] Two programmes in particular form the crux of India's co-operation efforts. The first provides direct development aid through the Ministry of External Affairs, including capacity building grants for infrastructure development and for the training of African personnel, usually within Indian institutions of higher education. Second, the Indian government provides concessional loans through the Export-Import Bank of India,

though, as discussed in the next section, these are primarily geared towards increasing the presence of Indian multinationals in Africa.

The total amount of Indian development aid has tripled over the past decade. More than 75% of the country's development assistance arrives in the form of grants mostly dispersed by the Ministry of External Affairs through a number of instruments. In Africa, the government has ramped up bilateral aid to African countries through the Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation (ITEC) programme and its corollary the Special Commonwealth African Assistance Programme (SCAAP).[14] These programmes offer capacity development by providing opportunities for African bureaucrats to receive skills training (such as in information technology and English) at various Indian academic institutes, as well as defence training at the relevant military academies.[15] Relatedly, scholarships are available for Africans to study for degrees in Indian institutions. Notably, in 2008, Prime Minister Singh increased the number of seats available for Africans to study at Indian institutions from 1,100 to 1,600 annually. In addition, the programmes provide Indian experts for deputation abroad in a variety of fields as well as more limited aid for disaster relief and donations of equipment for development projects.

India has sought to expand its reach in Africa by expanding to areas outside of its historic areas of influence along the Indian Ocean littoral zone. For example, India has used a mix of direct aid and concessional loans to win influence over the energy-rich West African sub-region, including specific programmes targeted towards the region. Launched in 2004, the Techno-Economic Approach for Africa–India Movement (TEAM-9) brought $500 million from the government of India for eight West African countries to improve food security, information technology and infrastructural support.[16] Projects include support for rural electrification in Ghana, a potable drinking water project in Equatorial Guinea, and other manufacturing sector support in places like Mali and Chad.[17]

Critics of India's African policy point out that much of this outreach has been directed towards regimes that do not meet even minimal standards of democracy or respect for human rights. India has come into criticism for forging particularly close relations with the repressive governments of Sudan, Ethiopia and Equatorial Guinea, among others. However, New Delhi tends to dismiss this criticism, arguing instead that it has always considered the sovereignty of all states the starting point for Indian foreign policy.

Indian financial interests in Africa

Much of the aid given to African countries has also been directed towards improving India's financial position on the continent. The goal is to increase market penetration for Indian commercial and defence products and, more importantly, to secure natural resources, especially oil, but also minerals and ores, timber and, increasingly, arable land.

The Indian government has sought to promote investment by Indian multinationals, primarily in energy sectors and infrastructure development, but increasingly across an array of economic activity by giving concessionary loans as an incentive to purchase Indian products. The government has set up lines of credit to purchase Indian exports, an effort referred to as the Focus Africa Programme. It is run by the Ministry of Commerce and administered through the EXIM Bank. Covering 24 African countries, the programme works to expand the size of Indian exports to Africa by working with regional trade blocks and financing trade promotion organizations. Criticized as little more than an export subsidy scheme by requiring that funding be 'tied' to the purchase of Indian goods and services, the programme does provide some needed funds to capital projects as well, often at concessionary rates between 0.25% and 0.75%, which are well below market rates.[18]

Zachariah Mampilly

Partially as a result of these efforts, Indian commercial firms have made substantive inroads across the continent. Large investors include Indian behemoths such as Tata, Mahindra, Essar, Bharti Airtel, Apollo Hospitals, educators like NIIT, and hoteliers such as Taj and Oberoi with investments in telecommunications, transport, information technology, steel, coffee, agriculture, health care and tourism. The list of smaller Indian firms doing business across the continent in almost every sector of African economies is, of course, too large to enumerate, but estimates put the number of Indian firms doing business across the continent at around 250 and growing rapidly.[19]

Analysts have widely focused on India's attempts to secure energy resources on the continent.[20] Estimates put the total amount of India's energy imports at over 70% of its total need and rising, and across the continent the country has worked assiduously to win partners to meet its rising needs. Demand for oil has pushed India towards West Africa for the first time, including an increasingly close relationship with Nigeria, India's largest African oil supplier and second globally after Saudi Arabia. Indian firms also compete and co-operate with their Chinese counterparts over access to more traditional oil providers such as Sudan and Angola (Vasudevan 2010).[21] In Angola, India has been unable to compete effectively with the Chinese, but it has had more success in Sudan, where the state-owned Oil and Gas Corporation (ONGC) working with its Chinese counterpart completed a $200 million pipeline in 2007. Currently, almost one-third of the country's oil imports come from Africa, with large increases expected in the future.[22]

The financial impact of these various initiatives has been substantial. In 2000, annual trade between India and African countries stood at approximately $3.39 billion. By 2007, it had risen to $30 billion.[23] In 2010, it reached $45 billion and estimates by India's Commerce Minister Anand Sharma put bilateral trade at $68 billion by 2012, an astonishing growth of over 1,000% in just a decade.[24]

India's security co-operation in Africa

India's security concerns intersect with African states around three primary issues. First and foremost, India is heavily invested in securing the Indian Ocean trade routes, particularly against threats from piracy. Second, the country is competing for influence within the Indian Ocean with China, which is engaged in a strategy of encirclement referred to as the 'String of Pearls' by a Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) report.[25] Third, India continues to contribute a large number of troops to UN peace-keeping efforts, including many to operations across the continent.

Piracy, particularly off the coast of Somalia and along the East African coast, has emerged as a mutual concern for every Indian Ocean economic power. The USA has made combating piracy a priority, and India and China have also sought to protect important trade routes from attack. The western edge of the Indian Ocean is central to global trade as goods travelling from Asia to Europe and beyond often must pass along the East African coast en route. Indian ships patrol the eastern coast of Africa from Mozambique to the Horn, ensuring safe delivery of ships laden with energy and other resources from the continent and manufactured goods from India.

China's increasing presence in the Indian Ocean has caused considerable consternation in New Delhi. China has been moving aggressively, forming partnerships and directing investments towards countries from Sri Lanka to Mozambique. In response, India has worked to promote the naval capabilities of several East African navies, engaging in joint exercises and providing training and equipment.[26] India has sought to revive the Indian Ocean Rim Countries' Association for Regional Cooperation (IOR-CAR), a largely moribund regional organization, as a security-focused initiative.[27] India also hosted the first Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS) in 2008 bringing together 26 chiefs of navy from across the Indian Ocean littoral states to discuss common security challenges and to reassert its influence within the Indian Ocean.[28] Notably, China was not invited to participate in the ongoing initiative.

On a separate track, New Delhi has long invested in promoting goodwill among African states by participating in UN peace-keeping operations. The country touts its longstanding record of contributing to various missions across Africa including in Somalia, Mozambique, Angola, Sierra Leone and, more recently, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Sudan/South Sudan. In many of these cases, including DRC and Sudan currently, India was the largest troop contributor to the missions, placing it third in the total number of troops provided. In Somalia, India had operational responsibilities for fully one-third of the country, the largest ever held by a UN contingent.[29] As of 2009, over 100,000 Indians had served in 43 operations around the world with 130 having lost their lives during their deployments abroad.[30] Currently, India has 8,680 personnel operating in nine of the 14 UN peace-keeping operations globally with the bulk concentrated in Sudan and DRC.[31] The country does possess several unique competencies that it touts in relation to its African peace-keeping efforts. Among these are a history of peace-keeping going back to the Korean War; the capacity to provide well-trained troops who are accustomed to operating in a diverse array of terrain; and unlike countries such as Pakistan and Bangladesh (the two largest contributors), India possesses stand-alone capability to support a peace-keeping operation on its own.[32]

Understanding India's African engagement

Despite the contributions summarized above, research on contemporary Indo-African relations remains behind research on Sino-African relations. Part of this has to do with the continuing tendency to treat India's engagement with Africa as driven by its competition with other great powers, in particular the rising hegemon of China. However, such an approach is based on a realist interpretation, i.e. that Indian engagement with Africa is merely a game of power. In contrast, the Indian government offers an historically inflected interpretation of its involvement, emphasizing its history of co-operation through anti-colonial and Third World associations like the NAM and the G77 as well as its cultural and ideological ties. Which of these approaches is better suited to explain the contemporary Indo-African relationship?

Despite the tendency for facile comparison, India and China's impact on Africa countries is not identical. For example, in one study of Indian and Chinese manufacturers' effect on the economies of the 13 largest African clothing manufacturers (representing 73% of total African exports), the authors discovered that 'Indian manufacturing exports are found to complement African exports of this commodity in the third market'.[33] This contrasts with Chinese manufacturers which were found to have a significantly negative effect. What accounts for this difference? The authors speculate that the 'close link between Indian and African manufacture-exporting firms' might explain why India has a net positive influence over the industry versus China's negative effect. In other words, the history of economic ties, particularly between small-scale independent traders from India and their African counterparts, results in a distinct effect on economic performance.

Neo-realists, described broadly, focus their analysis on the interactions of states within an anarchic international system. States are viewed as unitary and rational actors seeking to maximize their power to ensure their survival. This is primarily a function of military means but also economic and political factors as well. Realism has no interest in the impact of culture, history or ideology on state behaviour, subsuming these in favour of pure power politics. In addition, viewing states as unitary actors requires that domestic politics be bracketed from having any effect on the behaviour of the state in the international arena.

Pointing out that Indian foreign policy towards Africa exhibits self-interested behaviour is mundane bordering on tautological. Few states, if any, have ever pursued a foreign policy that is

Zachariah Mampilly

always against their own strategic interests. What is interesting are those cases in which states choose a foreign policy option that is either against their own interests or does not maximize their interests in favour of less optimal outcomes.

For example, while India's increasingly close relationship with the USA is often portrayed as an attempt to balance against the rise of China, Indian policy makers consistently refuse to denigrate China in order to curry favour with Washington.[34] This is often a point of frustration and confusion for many Western analysts, who believe that India and the USA have a natural partnership that can offset the rise of China. Though refusing to align with the USA no longer represents the moral bravery it once did during the Cold War, India's adoption of the position is not simply opportunistic but consistent with its historical behaviour. Some may respond that non-alignment is a suitable foreign policy strategy for a rising power seeking to expand its influence in a multi-polar world order, especially by wooing support from the vote-rich African continent in international forums. Yet any assessment of this strategy—not only in its formulation but also in how it is received by foreign governments—must recognize its relationship to the ideological footing of Indian foreign policy from an earlier era.

In addition to the theoretical weakness of a realist approach, there are several related empirical problems. First, Indian engagement with Africa is not a state-directed phenomenon as realism is wont to treat foreign policy. Realism requires a top-down focus ignoring interactions occurring at any other level. Analysts have made some progress by addressing private-sector investment but this, too, is limited by a statist bias that focuses primarily on government investment initiatives.

In truth, India's interactions with the continent cannot be viewed as unitary or top-down. Instead, a diversity of actors engage with Africa motivated by multiple reasons including historical ties, political solidarity, familial and cultural connections, and of course economic opportunities. As a result, research so far does not tell us much about the actual impact of India's influence on the ground, which is far more substantial than a purely macro-focused analysis would portray. As a result, India's engagement is interpreted selectively without providing a real sense of how it affects processes of order and disorder on the continent. As the next section will discuss, an analysis that bridges both international relations and comparative politics is necessary.

Second, research on the subject still betrays an East African/Southern African bias and fails to address India's interaction with West, Central and North Africa, especially those countries outside the Anglophone world. The result is that broad generalizations about Africa are faulty and prone to selection bias. At the same time, India-Africa relations are not a story of 54 bilateral relationships. African states have a set of common norms and experiences that define their interactions with the Asian powers given expression through the African Union (AU), which provide common ground for speaking of an 'African international relations'.[35] In addition, experiences of domestic disorder, export-oriented economies, low levels of democracy, robust and resented engagement with international organizations and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) all provide kindle to fuel relations between the two while demonstrating the need to identify distinct patterns of engagement whether led by the state, a diaspora, the private sector, religious groups, or civil society broadly defined.

A new approach

Conventional theories of IR cannot fully account for India's relationship with Africa. Focused as they are on state actors, they fail to grasp the depth and breadth of India's African sojourn. Instead, a better theory of Indo-African relations must move beyond the 'presentism' of contemporary analyses and seek to understand how contemporary patterns of engagement are layered over historical precedents. It must also get away from state-centric analyses discussed above to include relations between Indian society and its African counterparts.

Such an approach would break from a simplistic national/international binary in which international relations is thought of as simply relations between government actors while society is relegated to a bounded domestic sphere. Instead, a focus on societal actors would emphasize the transnational and global dimensions of non-state actors operating co-existentially alongside state actors, sometimes in harmony, but often, especially in this case, in discord. Moving away from statism is essential in order fully to comprehend the relationship between the two, though as yet few studies have attempted such an effort. As Michael Barnett suggests, scholars 'have moved away from statism because of the recognition that it does not provide leverage over important empirical outcomes'.[36]

Such an approach is especially important in this case as neither the Indian state nor its African counterparts are fully able to assert their power within the international system, often due to weaknesses in their domestic arrangements. Though India has become far more influential, it has never been able to push the global system according to its own imperatives. This was especially so in the post-Cold War global order when India became unmoored from its non-aligned roots. The result is that non-state actors have been at the forefront in shaping the perception of India and Indians abroad.

Indeed, the evolving relationship between Africans and Indians is only minimally mediated by governments, be it social activists interacting at the World Social Forums held in Dakar, Nairobi or Mumbai; educational and scholarly exchanges that bring African students and scholars to India and Indian scholars to the continents; film and other cultural engagements including the use of African locales by Indian film makers; the importation of Indian film talent by African media houses and capacity-building exercises such as the Indian director Mira Nair's East African Lab *Maisha*; and even religious interactions such as those promoted by the Indian spiritual leader Sadhguru.

Instead of relying on conventional theories, Indian-African relations provide an opportunity to develop and advance a non-Western approach to international relations.[37] As Barnett correctly points out, 'Mainstream IR tended to exile the Third World from international history and international relations theory'.[38] As a result of this lacuna, contemporary Indian-African relations provides an excellent opportunity to reconceptualize the role of the global South in international relations, and in particular the relevance and meaning of South-South relations.

Some scholars like Mohammed Ayoob and Amitav Acharya have called for research that takes specific non-Western engagements and offers a theory that extends to the international system. Ayoob has developed the concept he terms 'Subaltern Realism', which retains realism's emphasis on the state, but argues that not all states in the system are equal.[39] Positioning Third World states as subalterns, his approach would remove the dichotomy between domestic and international order, instead emphasizing how internal conflicts can spill over to the international sphere and how external factors can shape domestic politics. In contrast, Acharya rejects realism altogether, offering the notion of 'Subaltern constructivism'.[40] Constructivism focuses on historical relationships, cultural factors and ideological valences, and attempts to develop an understanding of the world through non-material factors. In particular, constructivists focus on the development of norms and the emergence of organizational cultures that shape behaviour among individual actors. Similarly, Acharya stresses 'the role of ideational forces as "weapons of the weak" available to and employed by Third World actors as constitutive instruments of the world polity'. In this account, 'Lacking in structural and material power, Third World states resort to ideas and norms to construct world politics'.

Indian leaders in particular have sought to link their ongoing efforts to reach out to African states to a history of ideological solidarity between the subcontinent and the continent, in particular their shared history of 'Third Worldism' and anti-colonialism. The Bandung conference of 1955

Zachariah Mampilly

brought together Asian and African leaders initiating a variety of international forums through which a particular conception of 'Third Worldism' came to the fore.[41] Among other efforts, African and Indian leaders were frequently at the lead in pushing efforts normatively to transform the international economic system by replacing the Bretton Woods system with the 'New International Economic Order', and in the process creating or claiming institutional bodies such as the Group of 77, the Non-Aligned Movement and the UN Conference on Trade and Development.

Many who have recently written about India's engagement with Africa dismiss these historical precedents, arguing instead that such prior interactions were mostly rhetorical with little impact on contemporary Indian or African behaviour, but the history of Third World co-operation continues to shape engagements between countries of the global South. Concepts and ideas developed during this period continue to constitute the language with which India and Africa speak to each other. Much more could (and should) be said about this.

The real question for students of Indo-African relations is whether pre-existing modes of analyses and theories are sufficient for understanding relations between countries of the Third World or if new approaches must be developed. Considering the historical Western bias of IR as a field as well as the vast gap between understandings of key concepts such as intervention, neo-colonialism and, of course, sovereignty, a new way is not only necessary but essential. In addition, any approach must take seriously the notion of certain types of internationalism and regionalism as being relevant to how these countries understand their position in the world and how they prefer the global community to be organized.

Conclusion

For too long, scholars from the global South have focused on Europe and North America as objects of grievance, envy, or aspiration. However, from the prevalence of corruption in the political systems, the lingering influence of traditional or religious authorities, the acceptance of grey and black economies, the intermingling of religious and secular traditions, the common history of trade and exchange, participation in transnational and transoceanic cultural communities, none being exclusive to South Asia or Africa but distinctive attributes shared by both, the lack of analysis of relations between the two regions reflects a colonial mindset no longer defensible intellectually.

Equally important, the prolonged economic slump that has undermined the USA and Europe since 2007/08 has accelerated the inexorable emergence of Asian economies at the centre of the global marketplace. Many African economies—directly linked to Asia's economic rise—have performed better (relatively) than many of the Western economies which now face 'structural adjustment' programmes from the same global financial institutions that have long been imposed upon and resented by Africans. The world, from some vantage points, has turned topsy-turvy, with Europe facing debt crises and African and Asian economies emerging relatively unscathed. Rather than being peripheral to the functioning of the global economy, South-South relations are beginning to emerge as a central component of international politics—a fact yet to be understood by most who study globalization. Studying Indian-African relations provides us with the opportunity to develop new models and understandings of this emerging global order.

Notes

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22 C. Obi, 'African Oil in the Energy Security Calculations of China and India', in Cheru and Obi, *The Rise of China and India in Africa*.

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Zachariah Mampilly

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