在美國研究孔子的學說:三個學派
(c) 2007 萬百安

在美國主要有三個學派研究孔子的學說。 (A)第一個是用所謂新儒學的觀點來研究孔 子。(B)第二個是用後現代主義的觀點來研究 孔子。(C)第三個則是用所謂美德倫理的觀點 來研究孔子。關於每個學派,今天我要解 釋:(1)第一:␣這個學派的特點是什麼?(2)␣第 二:這個學派對儒家有什麼看法?(3)第三:␣ 這個學派的優點和缺點是什麼?

(A)我首先要講新儒學。(1)新儒學是什 麼?為了瞭解新儒學的特點,我們必需先知 道新儒學是反對什麼看法的。新儒學反對什 麼看法?在二十世紀的前半段,當時有很多 人說孔子的思想沒有價值。這些人覺得孔子 的思想不過是封建社會的思想。跟現在社會 的民主主義,資本主義,以及科學方法不合適。可是新儒學家不同意這種看法。他們認 為即使在現代的世界,孔子的思想還是有價 值。所以新儒學第一個特點就是:(i)他們認 為儒家的思想還有價值。可是新儒學家也承 認孔子的古代社會跟我們現代化的社會很不 一樣。社會上的改變很大。新儒學第二個特 點是:(ii)他們認為民主主義,資本主義,以 及科學方法跟儒家的思想在根本上是不相互 矛盾的。現在的人可以一邊支持孔子思想的 主要精神,另一邊也支持民主主義,資本主 義,和科學方法。這是新儒學的第二個特 點。第三個特點就是:(iii)他們認為西方文化 和中國文化都有它們自己的特點。每個文化 的特點是什麼?西方文化有很多不一樣的來 源。西方文化包括古代希臘,羅馬和猶太文 化這些不同的來源。可是,他們認為中國文 化不是這樣。中國文化只有一個道統。這個 傳統的道統,在根本上本質是不變的。中西文化有這個根本上的不同是新儒學的第三個 特點。最有名的新儒學家包括中究院的劉述 先和美國伯思頓大學的Robert␣Neville。

(A.2)現在我要講:新儒學對儒家的看法 是什麼?新儒學家認為西方的文化和中國文 化各有自己的優點,也各有自己的缺點。西 方文化的優點包括科學方法和民主主義。儒 家必需接受這兩個西方文化的成就。可是中國文化也有自己的優點。中國文 化可以給西方文化五個很重要的啟示。(i)第 一:西方文化一直想要往前進步。求進步是 一件很好的事情。但是如果一個文化一直想 要往前進步,這種文化會讓西方人一直對自 己的生活覺得不滿意。中國文化可以教西方 人怎麼樣覺得滿意。(ii)第二:西方文化在邏 輯上的思想發展很完備。可是中國文化可以 教西方文化怎樣才能有一個比較完全的智 慧。(iii)第三:中國文化可以教西方文化怎樣才能有一顆感恩寬容的心去對待別人。(iv)第 四:中國文化可以教西方文化如何才能保存文化的精髓su[i(精華)。(v)第五:中國文化 可以教西方文化怎樣才能有「天下為公」, 或者「天下一家」的觀點。

(A.3)現在我要講:新儒學有什麼優點以 及缺點?依我看來,新儒學最重要的優點是他們 說:儒家跟民主主義以及科學方法沒有矛 盾。我完全同意這句話。可是新儒學重要的缺點有兩個。(i)第 一:其實儒家的傳統沒有不變的道統(本 質)。新儒學對道統的看法是這樣的:孟子 為我們解釋了孔子原來的意思。王陽明則解 釋了孟子原來的意思。(有的人說不是王陽 明,而是朱熹對孟子學說的解釋。)可是依 我看來孔子,孟子和宋明時代的道學家有很多不同之點。宋明時代,最基本上的概念是 萬物皆為一體。「萬物皆為一體」是什麼意 思?我用比喻來解釋這個意思。我的頭跟我 的手臂為一體。所以,如果你想打我的頭, 我的手臂就要保護我的頭。宋明的道學家認 為不只是我的頭和我的手臂為一體。萬物皆 為一體。既然萬物為一體,所以我們應該愛 所有的東西。如果一個人不愛別的人,這就 是因為他不知道別的人與他為一體。如果一 個人不知道別的人跟他為一體,他就有所謂 的「私意」。私意創造私欲。據這個看法, 私欲是人生最重要的問題。依我看來,這樣的概念跟孔子的概念沒 有關係。孔子沒說過「萬物皆為一體」。孔 子不講「私意」和「私欲」。為什麼孔子的 概念和宋明道學的概念有這樣的分別?這是 因為道學的形而上學的觀點受到佛教的影響 很大。所以我自己常常喜歡說:新儒學戴佛
教的眼鏡。用英文說:"New␣Confucianism␣is␣Confucianism␣seen␣through␣Buddhist␣lenses."(ii)新儒學的重要缺點之二:依我看來, 他們所講的那五個啟示太抽象。我想如果我 們仔細的檢察它們的內容,我們會發現這五 個啟示不只是中國文化對西方文化的啟示。 我們可以發現這五個啟示已經在西方文化之 中。
(B)我現在要講後現代主義的學派。後現 代主義,這個二十世紀西方思想上的運動, 對藝術,文學和哲學有很大的影響。(1)後現 代主義是什麼?Jean-Francois␣Lyotard,這個法 國的哲學家,說過了,後現代主義 是"incredulity␣toward␣meta-narratives."大概你們不 知道"incredulity␣toward␣meta-narratives"是什麼意 思。大概你們也覺得你們不知道的原因是因 為英文不是你們的母語。其實連我們從小說 英文的人也覺得這個說法很難懂!最有效的辦法是舉一個例子來解釋什麼是"incredulity␣ toward␣meta-narratives"。␣
我們都認為地球公轉(zhu]an)於太陽。可 是中世紀的西方人都認為太陽公轉於地球。 我們可以說這兩個理論是兩個故事,還是用 英文也可以說是兩個”narratives.”如果我問你 們為什麼我們應該相信地球公轉於太陽,大 概你們會這樣說:我們可以用所謂科學的方 法來證明這個理論。科學的方法將我們看的東西,聽的東西….等等,作為理論的根據。 如果某一個理論跟看的東西、聽的東西相符,我們才知道是對的。如果理論跟看的東 西、聽的東西有矛盾,我們才知道理論是不 對的。我剛才說的,這個解釋科學方法的故 事,我們也可以用英文說是一個”meta- narrative.”一個”meta-narrative”是一個故事關於 另外的故事。一個”meta-narrative”解釋為什麼我們應該相信別的故事。 我剛才說過了後現代主義的意思是”incredulity␣toward␣meta-narratives.”現在我們知 道”meta-narrative”是什麼意思。可 是”incredulity”是什麼意思?”Incredulity”的意思 就是不肯相信的態度。所以,無論是什麼樣 的”meta-narrative”,後現代主義者不願意相 信。結果是無論是什麼樣的故事,還是什麼 樣的理論,他們覺得都沒有確鑿(z>ao)的證 據。可是後現代主義者不是說我們不應該相 信我們的故事。比方說,我可以相信地球環
繞(hu>anr]ao)向太陽。可是如果有別的人相信 太陽公轉向地球,我必需承認他的故事跟我的故事在邏輯上有一樣的價值。 因為他的理論有它自己的meta-narrative.我的理 論也有我自己的meta-narrative.根據我的meta-
narrative,我的理論有證據。可是根據他的 meta-narrative,他的理論也有證據。所以沒有客觀的方法可以決定哪個理論是對的。 後現代主義有什麼結果?這個問題的答 案非常不清楚。有的人說,既然每一個人的 故事在邏輯上平等,所以我們應該鼓勵別人 創造新的故事,同時也不應該強烈反對或控制別人的故事。

(B.2)現在我要講,後現代主義對儒家有什麼看法?在美國,主要支持用後現代主義 來研究孔子的包括夏威夷大學的Roger␣Ames。 Ames認為孔子的思想跟西方的meta-narratives完 全沒有關係。他說西方的哲學家特別將調他 所謂”transcendence”。Transcendence是什麼意 思?我覺得,為了解釋transcendence的意思, 最好的方法是給一個例子。當然你們已經知 道笛卡兒是一位很有名的十七世紀西方哲學家。笛卡兒的meta-narrative是什麼?笛卡兒認 為我們可以拋棄所有傳統的意見,而且用我 們自己的思考能力來證明什麼理論是對的。 Ames說笛卡兒的方法是transcendent的方法,因 為笛卡兒說我們應該用邏輯的原則來判斷理 論的是非。可是我們不應該用理論來判斷邏 輯的原則。簡單的說,邏輯是理論的基礎, 可是理論不是邏輯的基礎。笛卡兒的meta- narrative和他的transcendence跟孔子的思想沒有 關係。 Ames也認為,既然孔子不會相信什 麼meta-narrative,所以孔子特別強調創造。 Ames認為孔子鼓勵我們藉由傳統創造新的思 維。
(B.3)現在我要講,後現代主義有什麼優 點和什麼缺點?後現代主義最重要的優點就 是他們說:孔子的思想跟笛卡兒的思想有基 本上的分別。孔子一定不是鼓勵我們拋棄所 有傳統的意見,而用我們自己的思考能力來證明什麼理論是對的。 可是後現代主義也有很嚴重的缺點。雖然孔子不會接受笛卡兒的meta-narrative,但這 不代表孔子否定所有的meta-narrative。其實, 孔子說:「述而不作。信而好古。」孔子也 說:「周監於二代,郁郁乎文哉!吾 從周。」(3.14)這兩個句子表示孔子的meta- narrative。孔子的meta-narrative是什麼?他認為 周朝的政府(我的意思是文王,武王和周公 的政府)是最好的政府,周朝的社會是最好 的社會,最和平,最光榮。他也認為如果我 們學習周朝的文化,用周朝的做法,我們可 以再一次達到周朝社會的成功。這不是笛卡 兒的meta-narrative。可是這一定是一種的meta- narrative.
(C)我現在要講美德倫理。美德倫理是什 麼?在西方的歷史上美德倫理原來是跟亞里
斯多德的哲學有密切的關係。在近代開始的 時候,很多哲學家批判亞里斯多德的哲學。 可是在二十世紀有美德倫理的復興。Alasdair␣ MacIntyre的After␣Virtue這本書,啟示美德倫理 的復興。(1)␣美德倫理的特點是什麼?我寫過 了一篇文章叫”Virtue␣Ethics␣and␣Confucianism”。 在這篇文章我說美德倫理強調四個問題:(i) 第一個問題是:什麼樣的生活是好的,什麼 樣的生活是壞的?比方有的人說,為了過好 生活需要有財富。可是別的人說為了過好生 活不必有很多財富,需要有朋友。強調這個 問題是美德倫理的特點,因為別的倫理理論 強調另外一個問題。比方說,你們已經知道 康德是一位十八世紀德國的哲學家。康德的 倫理不強調生活的方式。康德的倫理強調的 問題是:哪個行為是對的,哪個行為是不對 的?我們可以簡單的說:美德倫理強調人的 生活方式,別的倫理強調人的行為。(ii)第二個美德倫理強調的問題是:為了 過好的生活,人必需有哪種美德?比方說, 假設過好生活的人必需幫助別的人。為了過 這樣的生活,我們必需有慈善。如果沒有慈 善,那麼我們不願意幫助別的人。(iii)第三個強調的問題是:哪種修身的方 法會幫人修養美德?比方說 有的人讀書 有的人靜坐 有的人則以參與儀式的方式來達 成修身養性的目地。我們可以說這些都是修 身的方法。(iv)第四個問題是:人性是什麼?比方 說,在孟子的「告子上編」這本書裡頭,公都子說,「告子曰:“性無善無不善也。” 或 曰:“性可以為善,可以為不善。”…或曰:“有性善,有性不善。”」可是孟子 說,「性善」。這四個學說以外,還有別的學說。所以美德倫理的特點是強調這四個問 題:(i)什麼樣的生活是好的?␣(ii)有哪種美 德?(iii)修身養性的方法是什麼?(iv)人性是什 麼?。

(C.2)我現在要講美德倫理對孔子的看 法。提倡美德倫理的人認為孔子的思想是一 種美德倫理的思想。為什麼他們有這個看 法?因為孔子強調的問題也是美德倫理強調 的問題。比方說,孔子說子產「有君子之道 四焉:其行己也恭,其事上也敬,其養民也 惠,其使民也義。」(公冶長:5.16)這章 「道」這個字的意思就是生活方式。孔子是 說子產的生活有這四個地方。孔子也說: 「君子道者三,我無能焉:仁者不憂;知者 不惑;勇者不懼。」(憲問:14.28)在這章 裡,孔子講好生活的三個特點:不憂慮,不 疑惑,不畏懼。在這章裡孔子也講三個美 德:仁德,智慧,和勇敢。孔子對修身的看法是什麼?孔子說: 「君子博學於文,約之以禮,亦可以弗畔矣夫!」(雍也6.27;␣12.15)在這章 裡,「文」這個字是什麼意思?我覺得 「文」的意思包括學詩經,因為孔子也說我 們應該:「興於詩。立於禮。成於樂。」(泰伯8.8)孔子也鼓勵他的兒子學詩 經和典禮,說:「不學詩,無以言!… 不學禮,無以立!」(16.13)孔子對人性的看法是什麼?孔子 說,「性相近也,習相遠也。」(17.2)這章的 意思很不清楚。比方說,王陽明說人性善。 可是荀子說「性惡」。其實荀子的學說和王 陽明的學說都跟孔子說「性相近也,習相遠 也」,這句話,完全合適。所以如果我們要 知道孔子對人性的看法是什麼,我們必需觀 察孔子在別的章節裏說什麼。依我看來,孔子的學說跟荀子的學說很 近。為什麼呢?子貢說修身,「如切如磋, 如琢如磨」(學而1.15)。孔子贊成這句話。我 覺得這個說法跟荀子的學說很相似。當然我 說的或許是不對的。可是如果你同意王陽明 的學說,你也覺得孔子對人性有一種學說。 所以美德倫理學派說:(i)第一:孔子強調過 好的生活,(ii)第二:孔子強調有美德,(iii)第 三:孔子強調修身,(iv)第四:孔子對人性有 看法。如果你同意孔子強調這四個地方,那 麼你也屬於美德倫理的學派!
(C.3)我現在要講美德倫理的優點和缺 點。美德倫理的缺點是什麼?在西方,美德 倫理跟亞里斯多德的思想有關係。所以用美 德倫理來研究孔子有一個危險。這個危險是 容易把亞里斯多德的倫理跟孔子的倫理分辨 不清楚。所以提倡美德倫理的人要注意亞理 斯多德學說跟孔子學說的分別。美德倫理的優點是什麼?我覺得用美德 倫理的方法來研究孔子有兩個好處。(i)第 一:這樣的方法可以幫西方的哲學家瞭解孔 子的思想。在美國,哲學家常常不瞭解孔子 的思想。他們覺得論語這本書沒有道理。所 以他們也覺得孔子的思想對哲學沒有貢獻。 比方說,我上大學的時候,我哲學教授說過 中國文化沒有哲學。可是如果我們用美德倫 理的概念來解釋孔子的思想,西方哲學家也 可以欣賞孔子思想的價值。這是用美德倫理 的方法來研究孔子的第一個好處。(ii)第二個好處是什麼?如果中國和西方 哲學家瞭解孔子的思想是一種美德倫理的思 想,他們可以開始有相互有益的對話。什麼 樣的對話?對話的題目是關於生活方式,美 德,修身的方法,和人性。各方面可以給對 方提出新的問題,新的概念以及新的意見。

這個對話要什麼時候開始?我希望在這個地方和在這個時候開始。所以我謝謝你們 聽我的演講,也請你們給我你們的問題和意 見。

I also note that the full name (“Vassar College”) is sometimes written 瓦薩大學 or variants thereof.  However, a 大學 is often taken to be a university, rather than a college, so it is more correct to write 瓦薩學院.

Historically, the study of philosophy has been intended to make one a better person.  I am often surprised by how often people are surprised by this.  One frequently hears from Sinologists and philosophers — particularly those trained on volcanic archipelagos — that the difference between Chinese philosophy and Western philosophy is that the former emphasizes becoming a better person and solving social problems, while the latter is concerned only with purely theoretical truth.  This is perhaps true of what most of academic philosophy has become in the contemporary West, but it is certainly not true as a historic generalization.

In Plato’s dialogues, Socrates is presented as asking questions such as “What is courage?” “What is justice?” because knowing the answer will make us better people.  In addition, Plato’s Seventh Letter makes clear the ethical motive behind his philosophizing:

And I was forced to say, when praising true philosophy that it is by this that men are enabled to see what justice in public and private life really is. Therefore, I said, there will be no cessation of evils for the sons of men, till either those who are pursuing a right and true philosophy receive sovereign power in the States, or those in power in the States by some dispensation of providence become true philosophers. 

The authenticity of the Seventh Letter has been challenged, but even if it is not by Plato, it is by an ancient Platonist, and represents what must have been one common understanding of Plato’s project.

Turning from the pagan world, we find that the relationship between Christianity and philosophy has been complex.  St. Paul warned, “See to it that no one takes you captive through hollow and deceptive philosophy, which depends on human tradition and the basic principles of this world rather than on Christ” (Colossians 2:8).  Paul obviously sees philosophy as potentially having a negative effect on one’s character  But as any careful reader can see, this statement is ambiguous.  Is Paul warning against all of philosophy, which is intrinsically “hollow and deceptive,” or is he warning against one degenerate kind of philosophy? Most Christians have thought it was something more like the latter.  Typical is the view of St. Anselm, whose motto was “Fides quaerens intellectum”:  Faith seeking understanding.  This, too, is subject to multiple readings, and no Christian could consistently hold that only those intelligent enough to understand philosophy could be saved.  However, the majority view has been that, since God created us as rational creatures, erroneous philosophical views have a bad influence on us and correct views have a good influence.

Of course, those knowledgeable about the Confucian tradition will be aware that it understands learning as having an ethical focus:  

Imagine someone who recognizes and admires worthiness and therefore changes his lustful nature, who is able to fully exhaust his strength in serving his parents and extend himself to the utmost in serving his lord, and who is trustworthy in speech when interacting with friends and associates.  Even if you said of such a person, “Oh, but he is not learned.”  I would still insist that it is precisely such qualities that make one worthy of being called “learned.”  (Confucius:  Analects 1.7, Edward Slingerland trans.)

Now, does Schwitzgebel’s research show (or at least suggest) that Platonists, Christians, Confucians and others have been wrong in thinking that philosophy can improve one’s character?

Consider how we teach philosophy in a contemporary college or university setting.  (1) Students are generally 18 to 22 years old.  (2) They are admitted to the class based largely on their own choice.  Professors cannot refuse students admission to the class if there are spaces available, nor can they eject students from the class for anything other than extremely disruptive behavior.  (3) The student’s personal life is none of the professor’s business, unless the student chooses to share information.  (When a student does share personal information, it is generally in the context of attempting to justify a request for a special favor, such as turning in an assignment late.)  (4) Professors are expected to grade students solely on their academic abilities, such as vocabulary, memory, logical reasoning skills, and writing style. 

Contrast the preceding with what advocates of ethical education recommend.  (1) In Book I of his Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle writes,

Hence a young man is not a proper hearer of lectures on social life; for he is inexperienced in the actions that occur in life, but its discussions start from these and are about these; and, further, since he tends to follow his passions, his study will be vain and unprofitable, because the end aimed at is not knowledge but action. And it makes no difference whether he is young in years or youthful in character; the defect does not depend on time, but on his living, and pursuing each successive object, as passion directs. For to such persons, as to the incontinent, knowledge brings no profit; but to those who desire and act in accordance with a rational principle knowledge about such matters will be of great benefit. (W.D. Ross, trans., slightly modified)

Plato agreed.  For both of them, one needs to be raised in the right habits, and have experience of real life problems, before one can appreciate the insights of philosophy.  Aquinas went as far as saying that one couldn’t really begin the study of philosophy seriously until one was 50.  (Ironically, that is the age at which he died.)  Confucius’s view initially seems very different.  He says of himself, “At fifteen, I set my heart upon learning.”  However, he describes the process of ethical education as continuing throughout one’s life:  “At thirty, I was firmly planted. At forty, I was free of doubts.”  And so on until, “At seventy, I followed what my heart desired without overstepping the bounds” (Analects 2.4, my trans.)  And remember that “learning” for Confucians is not in any way limited to the study of books and theories.  The later Confucian Zhu Xi (Chu Hsi) made the process more explicit.  He proposed that at the age of eight students should begin the Lesser Learning, an education in basic skills like reading, writing and arithmetic, along with training in good habits and etiquette.  Only the promising students would go on to the Greater Learning, where they would learn the philosophical basis of the values they had started to internalize:  “Lesser learning is the direct understanding of such-and-such and affair. Greater learning is the investigation of such-and-such a principle — the reason why the affair is as it is” (Chu Hsi, Learning to Be a Sage, trans. Daniel K. Gardner, p. 90).

(2)  In classical ethical education, a student was expected to make a commitment to become a better person, and held accountable for failure to live up to this commitment.  The ancient Confucian Mengzi (Mencius) said, “There are many techniques of instruction.  My scorning to instruct someone is also a means of instruction” (6B16).  In the Confucian tradition, the student learns from the instructor’s refusal to take him as a student that he is not sufficiently serious or committed.  If the potential student changes and becomes committed, the instructor will accept him.  If the potential student does not change, there is no point in trying to instruct him.  I don’t think this would fly with a contemporary Dean, though.

So why doesn’t the contemporary study of ethics improve character?  (1) The students are too young and inexperienced about life to benefit from the study of philosophy.  Philosophy is about the why, not the what, and college-aged students don’t know the what very well yet.  (2) Students take ethics classes without demonstrating any commitment to becoming a better person, and without any penalty for failing to manifest a commitment.  (3) The instructor is institutionally forbidden from inquiring into attempting to influence the student’s personal life, where most of his or her character will be manifest.

• I get very high numerical evaluations by students in my classes.  These are on forms that are distributed only to students in my class, and the results are not reported unless a large percentage of students respond.  Again, this is good, but there is limited evidence that student satisfaction correlates with learning.  As I tell my colleagues ad nauseam, there is empirical evidence of a correlation between student learning and student responses to only two questions:  “Did the professor stimulate your interest in the topic?” and “Did the professor help you learn?”  (Ken Bain, What the Best College Teachers Do, p. 13.)  Neither question is on my school’s numerical evaluations.
• I give out far fewer A’s and A-’s in my classes than the school average.  In theory, this means that I am holding my students to a higher standard.  This is probably good in itself.  We don’t need half of our students assuming they are exceptionally talented at things they are merely slightly above average at.  But I succumb to institutional peer pressure in giving out far too many B’s and too few C’s.   Besides, even if I am more demanding in my grading, does that really show I am teaching students more, or giving them better skills?
• I sincerely work to respond effectively to student reactions and feedback.  I put a lot of energy into class discussions and lectures:  I walk around the room, I gesticulate, I modulate my voice, I tell anecdotes, I write on the board, I make self-deprecating jokes, I try to invite shy students into the discussion.  I have also modified many aspects of the course to find what works.  For example, I used to assign only essays, but I added a final exam because I found that even some earnest students were not absorbing all the basic facts I wanted them to grasp by the end of the course.  Once again, the preceding earns me a pat on the head, but does it make me more than a “hard-working” professor?
• I have had students tell me long after grades were handed in things like, “I found your course inspiring” or “Your course changed my life.”  Good, but there is a size of sample problem.  In addition, how do I know that I have influenced students in a good way?  Charles Manson’s disciples found him inspiring too.  (Quick disclaimer:  I am deeply grateful to and touched by the students who told me these things.  I’m just trying to look at what they reported dispassionately as evidence.)

Part of the difficulty in evaluating my teaching (or that of anyone in the humanities) is that the criteria for success are more nebulous.  If you try to teach students calculus, and they know how to use it after your class, you have taught them successfully.  If I try to teach students to write clearly and persuasively, to read texts with more attentiveness and insight, and to be more reflective about their lives and the world — it is very hard to know how to test whether I have succeeded.  However, the alternative is not to try to teach them those things, and it’s better to live with the uncertainty than not to try.

I got an eye roll from one of my colleagues when I compared playing poker to investing in stocks.  His father was a compulsive gambler, which probably contributed to the reaction.  (I’m sure children of alcoholics are not interested to hear that a glass of wine with dinner is actually good for you.)  However, my colleague’s response reflects widespread ignorance about how poker differs from pure gambling.  An anecdotal illustration of the difference is the cautionary tale of Las Vegas legend Archie Karas. In the early 1990s, Karas won $40 million dollars beating people at poker and pool, games of skill, and then lost it all over a period of three weeks playing high stakes craps and baccarat, games of chance.  But let’s look more precisely at the difference.

Suppose you play roulette and wager $1 on number 13.  The numbers on an American roulette wheel are 1 to 36, along with both a 0 and a 00.  So the odds against you winning are 37:1.  If you do win, you will be paid $35 for every $1 you wagered.  So, on average, for every thirty eight $1 wagers you make, you will lose $37 and win $35 for a net of -$2 over 38 tries.  (Alternatively, your expected value for any one bet is 1/38*$35-37/38*$1=-$1/19.)  All house games are like this, which is why they cannot be beaten.  You will always lose in the long run.

In poker, though, you win or lose almost all your money from other players, not the casino.  The casino makes a profit by taking a “rake” from every pot, usually 10% and capped at a certain amount (e.g., never more than $4 per pot for low stakes).  This makes it sound like the casino doesn’t make very much from poker.  It doesn’t.  Most casinos would rather have slot machines in what are now their poker rooms.  However, customers who play poker are a cranky and insistent bunch, and believe it or not that can make a difference.  In addition, casinos count on the poker players (or their spouses) also stopping by the pit to lose money at games like craps and roulette.  In other words, poker is often what salesmen call a loss leader.

Of course, even if the house is taking very little out of the pot, that doesn’t prove by itself that any one player can win.  But there are two reasons why one can win money.

1. Most players make mathematical errors in their betting.
2. Most players are very predictable.

(1) Suppose it is the middle of a poker hand, with $2000 already in the pot.  (If you are completely ignorant of poker, the “pot” is the money that has already been wagered and will be taken by whoever wins the hand.)  Arnie and Brenda each have $1000 in their “stacks” (the money that each has not yet wagered).  Arnie has a pair of aces, while Brenda only has an inside straight draw.  Brenda will win if she successfully completes her straight, but will lose otherwise.   It is Arnie’s turn to act, and he wagers all of his remaining $1000, so the pot is now $3000.  Brenda has two choices:  she can fold, which means that she gives up any chance of winning the pot, but also risks no more money, or she can call by adding $1000 to the pot, which means that she still has a chance to win the pot, but can also lose the additional $1000.  So if Brenda calls she is risking $1000 to win $3000, giving her odds of 3:1.  Assuming that Brenda will get one more card, the odds are approximately 11:1 against her completing her straight.  So for every 12 times Brenda calls in a situation like this, she will win $3000 one time, and lose a total of -$11,000 for the other times, for an average net of -$8000 over every 12 hands.  (If you prefer, the expected value of her call is 1/12*$3000-11/12*$1000=-$667.)  Although Brenda should definitely fold, it is amazing how often players in similar situations call.

What about Arnie?  If he does not bet, he is giving Brenda a chance to beat him at no cost to her, so he should bet.  If he bets and Brenda folds, he wins $2000 at no cost to himself.  If he bets and Brenda calls, he will lose -$1000 one time out of 12 and win $22,000 the other 11 times, so the situation is immensely profitable for him on average.  However, many players in Archie’s situation either check (do not bet) or bet an amount small enough that Brenda actually does have the right odds to call.

An objection may occur:  “Your description of the situation ignores the fact that Brenda doesn’t know that Arnie has a pair of aces and Arnie doesn’t know that Brenda has an inside straight draw.”  This brings us to the second reason that you make money at poker.

(2) Most players are very predictable.  I’ll illustrate this with the Baluga Whale Theorem (BWT), a generalization well known among savvy poker players.  I should explain that BWT is not a “theorem” in the sense we talk about mathematical theorems.  Rather, it is a generalization about how people tend to play at low stakes.  BWT is also not a recommendation about how people should play.  However, it has implications for what the correct play is.  I’m going to give a very oversimplified version of it here simply to make a point.

BWT applies to small stakes hold’em poker.  In hold’em, each player is dealt two “hole cards” that only she sees.  There is then a round of betting.  Next three “community cards” (called the “flop”) are dealt face up in the middle of the table.  Each player can use any or all of these cards to make the best poker hand in combination with their two hole cards.  There is another round of betting after the flop.  Then a fourth card is dealt face up (called the “turn”) and there is another round of betting.  Finally, a fifth card is dealt face up (called the “river”) and there is the last round of betting.

Suppose you raise on the first round of betting and are called by one player.  The flop comes, you bet and are called by the same player.  The turn comes, and it is a card that would appear to most players to be a “blank” (a card that is unlikely to connect with anyone’s hole cards).  You bet, and the other player now raises you.  The Baluga Whale Theorem says that the opponent who raises you here, after calling pre-flop and on the flop, probably has a very strong hand.  Why?  Because that is the way that most small stakes players play when they make a big hand on the flop in this situation.  The reason this is so important is that, if you know BWT, you can figure out what kind of hole cards your opponent has, even though you can’t see them directly.  You can save money by folding what would normally be a strong hand in the face of a BWT-type raise on the turn, or if you have an exceptionally strong hand, you know that you can put in a big re-raise and get called.  This is just one example of a common pattern of play.

Since playing predictably allows thoughtful players to determine your hole cards, why not play unpredictably?  Part of the answer is that better plays do play unpredictably to a certain extent.  Good players will sometimes check with a hand you would expect them to bet, or raise a hand you would expect them to fold.  However, the only way to be absolutely unpredictable is to completely randomize one’s play:  check, bet, fold and raise without regard to the value of your hands.  But there is a high cost of complete randomization.  You will frequently wager a lot with weak hands, and wager little with strong hands.  This will be a mathematical error, and against even a moderately skilled player you will lose in the long run (remember our point 1).  Consequently, against a good player you have to partially randomize your play, and do so at points that are likely to be misleading to the particular player you are up against.

How much randomization?  And what kinds of randomizing will mislead your opponent?  There is no fixed rule about this.  Indeed, there cannot be a fixed rule about deceptive play, because there is a counter strategy for every deception.  Perhaps the most basic strategy in hold’em poker is to make a “continuation bet” on the flop, after raising pre-flop, regardless of whether the flop helped your hand.  The continuation bet is a sort of bluff bet, in which you pretend that either the flop made your hand stronger, or you already had such a strong hand that you didn’t need the flop to help you.  A continuation bet will often allow a player to win the pot with a weak hand.

However, since continuation betting is a basic strategy, almost everyone knows it, and many players will respond by calling your flop raise.  If you check on the turn, your opponent will guess that you were simply continuation betting the flop, and will bet the turn himself, winning the pot.  (This technique is called “floating.”)  Of course, many players know about floating, so they will continuation bet on the flop and then bet again on the turn, even if the turn did not help their hand either.  (This is called “double-barreling.”)  Of course, many players know about double-barreling, so…and the process goes on forever.  Truly great players have a skill that goes beyond any rules that allows them to win consistently in the long run.

Long ago, Aristotle recognized that there are skills like this.  One of his favorite examples was sailing a boat.  A boat captain knows many rules of thumb (“red sky at night, sailor’s delight; red sky in the morning, sailor take warning”).  He also knows some mathematical facts (“if the ship’s center of gravity is above the water line, it will begin to capsize”).  However, the complete set of rules underdetermines the correct action in any situation.  This is why sea captains are given both immense discretionary authority but also held very accountable for anything that goes wrong.  Aristotle thought that ethical wisdom, phronesis, is a similar kind of skill that is underdetermined by precise rules.   I think so too, and I think my knowledge of poker has helped me philosophically by giving me another example of a knowledge that is like Aristotelian practical wisdom.  In both poker and in ethics, there are right choices and wrong choices, despite the fact that there is no algorithm for the decision procedure.  And, in both, some people are demonstrably better at making the right choices. (I could go on:  going “on tilt” is one poker manifestation of Aristotelian akrasia, “weakness of will,” in which one knows, in some sense, the right choice but makes the wrong choice.)

I was curious about whether (and if so, how) her philosophy background helped in her career.  She replied and gave me permission to quote her:

I knew in my last year of High School that Philosophy was the obvious choice.  It seemed obvious because I thought it would expand my choices as a graduate. I think it did, and I am still pleased with the choice even though Psychology probably would have served dog training better.

I really enjoyed my later years at Vassar as a Philosophy major. I felt like I was getting to hone my craft. I think studying Philosophy in college was a lot like choosing to be an entrepreneur; the beginning was hard but when I pushed through I really found something special that I loved and made my own.  Majoring in Philosophy still helps me today because it gave me great analytic and writing skills. Most people assume philosophers cannot write! This helps me a great deal with writing my own materials for marketing as well as for clients.

In life philosophy taught me how to argue from any angle, and how to predict the other person’s argument, etc. It gives me confidence in most conversations / social situations. Maybe it’s my personality that I am not easily intimidated,  but class is great practice for taking a fledgling idea, and arguing for it. Lastly, studying Philosophy taught me to distance myself from depressing notions and to keep myself grounded. I could see that if people continued to delve deeper and deeper into questions outside of class, it really separated them from reality. I think it was the beginning of work-life balance for me. Philosophy Majors are seen as useless by plenty of parents, but actually it taught me not to get lost in thought.

Although there is much talk about multidisciplinary studies at the moment, a philosophy department will want you to have a PhD in philosophy, and a Chinese department will want you to have a PhD in Chinese.  In short, the doctoral program you pick determines what kind of department you will be able to teach in.  For what you are interested in studying, you will need a PhD in philosophy.  You will simply not get the right sort of training or support for your particular research interests in a Chinese department.  It is important, however, that you take courses in Chinese language (both modern Mandarin as well as Literary Chinese), literature, and history while you are pursuing your doctorate in philosophy.

Regarding employment opportunities, I must be honest with you here, even though it will be discouraging.  The job situation in philosophy right now is catastrophic.  There are massive cuts to higher education at both the federal and state levels.  As a result, many philosophy departments are under threat of being completely eliminated, and the ones that survive are being downsized, meaning that retiring faculty are not being replaced.  In addition, when someone specifically working in Chinese philosophy retires, even if the institution authorizes a replacement, that person is seldom replaced with a scholar who studies Chinese philosophy.  The University of Michigan, Stanford, Berkeley, and the U of Connecticut all had leading scholars of Chinese philosophy in their philosophy departments.  None of them were replaced when they retired or left the institution. I am less familiar with the job market in Chinese language and literature, but all departments are feeling the economic crunch.  In addition, my sense is that the trend in Chinese language programs is to hire more and more native speakers of Chinese.   (For example, our Chinese-Japanese Department has three native-Chinese speaking professors, one native-Japanese speaking professor, a number of native-Chinese or -Japanese speaking adjuncts, and me.)  Sorry for not having more encouraging news, but anyone who tells you anything more optimistic about the job situation is either not being realistic or not being honest.

Here are a couple of other points to consider.  I think that a broadly analytic approach to Chinese philosophy is very valuable, and is what I pursue myself.  What I mean by “broadly analytic” is that there is an emphasis on clarity of expression, disambiguation, and the careful formulation and critique of arguments.  However, in my opinion, there is little work to be done on the philosophy of language, per se, in traditional Chinese thought.  You would be working almost exclusively with the texts of the so-called “School of Names” and the Later Mohist writings.  I think these brief works have been picked over so much already that there is not too much more to say.  (See the chapter, “Language and Paradox in the ‘School of Names,’” in B.W.V.N., Introduction to Classical Chinese Philosophy.)  Similarly, the sorts of issues that engage analytic epistemology (e.g., “How do we know that the world presented to our senses is real?” “How do we know that other bodies have minds?” “How does induction work?”) were never central to early Chinese philosophy.  Admittedly, the Consciousness-Only School of Buddhism did engage some of these issues in the later Chinese tradition.  You might focus on this, but I am aware of only one competent book that has been done on this topic (Buddhist Phenomenology by Dan Lusthaus).  That means there is much potential for research, but also that you will have trouble finding anyone to guide you in your research.  This is a bigger problem than it might seem at first.

I am attaching a special issue of the APA Newsletter on “the crisis in Chinese philosophy.”  Obviously, I am partial to my own contribution to this newsletter, but it is worth reading all of them to get a broader perspective.  (Do keep in mind, though, that since the publication of this newsletter, the job market has gotten worse, and some people mentioned are no longer teaching Chinese philosophy.)

More to come (I’m sure).

The goals of the Northeast Conference on Chinese Thought (NECCT) are twofold:

1. To provide a regional forum for everyone from graduate students to established scholars to present work, learn from one another, and establish or strengthen mutual relationships; and
2. To bring together scholars and students who approach Chinese thought from diverse disciplinary perspectives so as to foster understanding of our various objectives, perspectives, and constraints—the point not being to privilege one approach or hope for a grand synthesis, but simply to encourage each of us to be less insular and to find ways to learn from the approaches of others.

We will issue a call for abstracts later in the Spring, the submission deadline for which will be June 1. Papers will not be circulated in advance, there will be no pre-determined commentators, and we do not anticipate a conference volume. In short, this is intended to be an informal (though high-quality) discussion at which new ideas and work-in-progress are very welcome.

We anticipate that our budget will be able to cover up to two nights of lodging in Middletown for those whose papers are accepted, as well as meals during the conference for all registered participants. Everyone will be responsible for his or her own transportation to Middletown.

Please be in touch if you have any questions (see the conference organizer’s webpage here), and keep an eye open for the formal Call for Abstracts.

Sincerely,

NECCT 2013 Advisory Board
Stephen Angle (Wesleyan, Philosophy and East Asian Studies)
Erin Cline (Georgetown, Theology)
David Elstein (SUNY New Paltz, Philosophy)
Paul Goldin (Penn, East Asian Languages and Civilizations)
Hagop Sarkissian (CUNY, Philosophy)
Bryan Van Norden (Vassar, Philosophy and Chinese-Japanese)

Obviously, I am disgusted by these people and what they stand for.  However, I wonder if they best strategy is is to oppose them with humor and ridicule rather than anger?  I’m working on coming up with some signs to put in the windows of my car as I drive into campus.  Here are some phrases that I am considering:

• As Jesus said about gay people, “           .”
• Gay sex is sin-sational!
• If you don’t like gays, blame straight people:  they’re the ones having gay babies.
• The gay agenda:  spend time with family, be treated equally, buy milk.
• Dorothy left Kansas for a reason.
• Newt Gingrich has had three wives; my sister just wants one.

(I hasten to add that I swiped these from internet sources.  I haven’t come up with anything close to witty myself on this topic.  The best I could do was, “I love my gay French Bulldog!” but I think that’s more surreal than funny.)

Oh, and I also enjoyed comedian Jeff Ross’s visit to these guys (Not Safe for Work!).

EDIT:  I’m thinking about putting a sign on my door that says, “I’m gay for the day!  Gay-straight solidarity at Vassar!”  (Is that stupid or supportive?  Sometimes I have a tin ear for these things.)